

MUCKAMORE ABBEY HOSPITAL INQUIRY
SITTING AT CORN EXCHANGE, CATHEDRAL QUARTER, BELFAST

HEARD BEFORE THE INQUIRY PANEL
ON WEDNESDAY, 29TH MARCH 2023 - DAY 30

30

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I N D E X

P A G E

PROFESSOR ROY McCLELLAND

- EXAMINED BY MR. MCEVOY

7

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON WEDNESDAY, 29TH MARCH 2023, AS
2 FOLLOWS

3
4 CHAIRMAN: Good morning. Thank you very much. Just
5 give me a second, sorry. 09:59

6
7 Can I just mention to everybody, a couple of days ago
8 we had some problems with the electricity here. We're
9 not expecting anything to go wrong this morning but if
10 the lights do go out, don't panic, the emergency lights 09:59
11 will go on and we will evacuate. But we're hoping that
12 won't happen.

13
14 Mr. McEvoy, I think we are lucky enough to have
15 Professor Roy McClelland this morning. 09:59

16 MR. McEVOY BL: That's right, Chair and Panel. Just by
17 way of introduction, if I might, and just by way of a
18 brief recap, last week on Days 28 and 29 of the
19 Inquiry's hearing, the Inquiry heard from Mr. Alex Ruck
20 Keene and Professor Roy McConkey who gave presentations 09:59
21 setting the scene from a legal and policy perspective
22 regarding the Framework of Mental Health Law in
23 Northern Ireland and then the Public and Health Policy
24 Landscape, which led to the establishment of the
25 Bamford review and to the passing then subsequently by 10:00
26 the Northern Ireland Assembly of the Mental Capacity
27 Act 2016, parts of which are already in force, and
28 other parts of which, as you heard, have yet to be
29 commenced.

1 This morning the Inquiry's working Module 1 and its
2 exploration of the Bamford Review and related
3 developments continues with evidence, as you say, from
4 Professor Roy McClelland.

5
6 The Inquiry will have seen that Professor McClelland
7 had produced to the Inquiry a comprehensive statement
8 with extensive exhibits. It begins at number 083 and
9 following.

10
11 With that, I can ask for Professor McClelland to be
12 brought in, please.

13
14 PROFESSOR McCLELLAND, HAVING BEEN SWORN WAS EXAMINED BY
15 MR. MCEVOY, AS FOLLOWS:

16
17 CHAIRMAN: Can I welcome you, Professor McClelland.
18 Thank you very much for coming along, especially since
19 I know you are suffering slightly at the moment. If
20 you need a break at any stage, just let us know and
21 we will stop. But in the meantime I will hand you over
22 to Mr. McEvoy. Thank you very much.

23 MR. MCEVOY BL: You will have heard the Chair's
24 injunction, Professor, if you do feel that you need a
25 break at any moment, please don't hesitate to say.

26
27 Professor, as you know my name is Mark McEvoy, I am one
28 of the Inquiry counsel. We met briefly earlier this
29 morning.

1 By way of introduction of you, you are a consultant
2 psychiatrist by profession and in that capacity you're
3 employed by the Belfast Trust, isn't that's right? And
4 you are also a Emeritus Professor of Mental Health at
5 Queen's University Belfast. 10:02

6 A. I am.

7 1 Q. You're here before the Inquiry today because between
8 2022 and 2007, you were involved with what began as the
9 review of Mental Health and Learning Disability
10 Northern Ireland. Initially you were the Deputy Chair 10:02
11 of that Review and then you assumed the Chair of that
12 Review following the untimely death of Professor David
13 Bamford in January 2006.

14
15 I indicated before you joined us, Professor, that you 10:03
16 have very helpfully produced a comprehensive statement
17 of some 31 pages and then a significant number of
18 exhibits. The questions that I have arise from the
19 statement itself, but before I do that I wanted to ask
20 whether you had the opportunity to see the two 10:03
21 presentations that were delivered to the Inquiry last
22 week on Monday from Mr. Alex Ruck Keene, and then on
23 Tuesday from Professor Roy McConkey?

24 A. I did indeed, I saw both of them and I found them
25 excellent. 10:03

26 2 Q. In general terms, and before we develop the themes in
27 your statement, is there anything that you would like
28 to take the opportunity now to add or to comment on in
29 terms of what you saw in those two presentations?

1 A. Well, I would appreciate the opportunity, if possible,
2 of making a comment on a matter raised by Mr. Alex Ruck
3 Keene in relation to the UNCRPD situation and also
4 something that Roy McConkey raised in relation to the
5 funding expectations from the Bamford side that came up 10:04
6 in his presentation from a question put to him by a
7 member of the Panel.

8 3 Q. Yes, it is likely that we'll touch on that in the
9 fullness of time anyway. But if you want maybe just to
10 touch on the issue that you mentioned in relation to 10:04
11 the presentation given by Mr. Alex Ruck Keene KC, that
12 might be helpful.

13 A. Well, it may take a few moments. I have committed my
14 thoughts to paper.

15 4 Q. Okay. 10:04

16 A. So that the Panel, if they wish to have them, copies of
17 these, I can make them available. If that's...

18 5 Q. Well, we haven't seen the document in question so
19 perhaps what we'll do is we will maybe consider that at
20 the end. I'm taking you out-of-your course slightly, 10:05
21 but if there's anything you may want to say by way of
22 summary at this stage, that might be helpful, just in a
23 sentence or two?

24 A. Well, I think that the legislation that we have
25 probably has a kind of robustness in relation to the 10:05
26 UNCRPDs expectations around the substitute
27 decision-making requirement. But the second thing that
28 really needs to be considered in a little more thought
29 is that we're not dealing simply with mental capacity

1 legislation, what we have is fusion legislation. In
2 any jurisdiction in which the UNCRPD is questioning the
3 adequacy of the Mental Capacity Act, there is sitting
4 in parallel a Mental Capacity Act in each of the
5 jurisdictions and each of these is rounded on 10:06
6 substitute decision-making. So there is an issue
7 around whether you can completely remove substitute
8 decision-making.

9 6 Q. Well thank you for sign-posting that at this stage. It
10 is certainly a thing we'll come back to towards the end 10:06
11 of this evidence session.

12
13 If I can just take you to the substance of the
14 statement that you provided. You very helpfully broke
15 your statement down into headings. At the outset, I 10:06
16 think I've given a very rudimentary description of your
17 background and your professional qualifications and so
18 on. Is there anything that I have missed there?
19 I based your introduction on what you tell us about the
20 Bamford Review generally. Is there anything you wish 10:06
21 to add?

22 A. That's fine. That's fine by me.

23 7 Q. We're told in your statement that during the Bamford
24 Review, Muckamore Abbey was one of three hospitals in
25 Northern Ireland caring for those with a learning 10:07
26 disability. You mention the others then as Longstone
27 and Stradray. I'm at paragraph 7. You said in 2003
28 when the Review began, there were around 455 people
29 living in hospitals. You break the numbers down as

1 follows:

- 2
- 3 - 300 in Muckamore.
 - 4 - 115 in Longstone and;
 - 5 - 40 in Stradray.

10:07

6

7 You then tell us that they had done so, on average, for

8 20 years and had an average age of 49. Pausing there,

9 to the uninitiated lay person like myself that might

10 seem surprising. Is it that length of time and life

11 experience or amount of life experience to be spent as

12 an in-patient?

10:07

- 13 A. Well, this was a phenomena of Mental Health Services
- 14 for years and then with the growth of the hospital
- 15 provisions in learning disability, people with learning
- 16 disability were less accommodated in mental hospitals
- 17 and more in the learning disability situation. So
- 18 people spending many years in Hospital, society's way
- 19 of coping in previous years was one very much of social
- 20 exclusion and people whose behaviours were problematic,
- 21 and in the absence of modern methods of healthcare and
- 22 social care, families had little resource. You have to
- 23 think of the poverty of the background situation that
- 24 people in the community would often be in in these
- 25 situations.

10:08

10:08

10:08

26

27 So having a place of safety was sometimes a better

28 alternative to the misery of some of their own personal

29 situations and the difficulties people had coping and

1 without any support. So you had a massive growth in
2 asylum over the 18th, 19th Century especially, late
3 19th Century, right into the 20th Century, and it is
4 only in the mid-20s we begin to see this coming down.

10:09

5
6 As I say, recently in Northern Ireland the long-stay
7 needs of people with a learning disability would have
8 been met within the learning disabilities hotel
9 structure, which were these three hospitals.

10 8 Q. That length of survey, that sort of average of
11 20 years, how did that compare to other jurisdictions
12 on these islands, or are you able to comment?

10:09

13 A. I don't have first-hand knowledge at this moment, but
14 intuitively it would have to be similar. This is not
15 purely a Northern Ireland phenomenon. This is a
16 western world phenomenon. It is the way we dealt with
17 the more vulnerable, the intellectually disabled, the
18 mentally-ill, chronically mentally-ill over 100 years
19 at least.

10:10

20 9 Q. I suppose we can understand a little bit more about
21 that idea of social exclusion and people with either a
22 mental health difficulty or a learning disability
23 finding their way into Muckamore for a long time, or
24 hospitals like it indeed. Was there a sort of lumping
25 together of mental health need, patients with mental
26 health needs and also then patients with learning
27 disabilities during this time or during the period
28 around which the Review began?

10:10

29 A. From my understanding we had a very full separation of

1 mental health services for people of the normal range
2 of mental abilities in the mental hospital structures.
3 We had this growth in provision for learning disabled
4 people. People in learning disability in long-stay
5 hospitals will include people who have mental health
6 difficulties as well. 10:11

7 10 Q. Yes.

8 A. People with learning disabilities are more vulnerable
9 to mental health problems. So per unit of their
10 population they would have a higher prevalence of 10:11
11 mental health need and some of these needs would be
12 considerable. So a significant component of the
13 learning disability hospital provision would have been
14 a mental health provision for people with a learning
15 disability. But a significant amount would have been 10:12
16 for lesser issues and lesser mental health problems for
17 which, in a more modern progressive social provision
18 could be well-provided for in a much more normal
19 community home-type setting.

20 11 Q. The Bamford Review, as we know, looked into mental 10:12
21 health and learning disability. It is perhaps asking
22 you to employ a bit of hindsight, and I might do that
23 once or twice during the course of the morning, but was
24 there a reason why, and you may have answered the
25 question already, but was there a reason why the two 10:12
26 areas, if you like, were dovetailed in that way? Then
27 I suppose a corollary of that might be --

28 A. Should it have been.

29 12 Q. -- should they have been, exactly?

1 A. Yes. I think, my understanding of the history of this
2 is a group of us from The Royal College of
3 Psychiatrists began a review of the mental health
4 legislation, which of course to people of mental health
5 and people with a learning disability. We put together 10:13
6 a report recommending reform and modernisation and
7 asked the Department to consider review of legislation.
8 That was in 2001 we submitted that. The Bamford Review
9 was commenced in 2002 and it said it should be a reform
10 and modernisation of services for people with mental 10:13
11 health needs and learning disability needs and a review
12 of legislation. I think that was a very sensible thing
13 to take services and legislation together.

14 13 Q. Yes?

15 A. Because you can't have one step forward without the 10:13
16 other. So in that sense they were more insightful than
17 we were simply saying let's look at legislation.

18
19 I think there is a tension in trying to marry efforts
20 modernising mental health services and modernising 10:14
21 learning disabilities services. There are shared
22 issues, stigma issues, for example. But a major thrust
23 of mental health is services to deliver better
24 treatment and interventions in a range of settings as
25 accessible to people as possible or else a major thrust 10:14
26 of learning disability is normalisation and helping
27 people to live fuller lives.

28
29 I think there was a natural sensitivity within the

1 Equal Lives Review that they would get overburdened
2 with our pressure on service improvement and both David
3 and I were very sensitive to that and we gave them a
4 very free hand to do their excellent work.

5 14 Q. Yes? 10:15

6 A. And it was one of several committees. That said, they
7 were one of the first Committees to bring a report
8 forward and I think they had the expectation that
9 because they were learning disability, that their
10 report would be implemented forthwith, whereas they had 10:15
11 to wait until all the reports came in.

12 15 Q. Was there a reason why that was so? Was there a reason
13 why Equal Lives and its recommendations had to be stood
14 over?

15 A. I think it can be defended in the sense that I think 10:15
16 there was a tremendous breadth to what we were coming
17 forward with and we had done our best to cost it. But
18 until you put the whole thing together, you didn't
19 really know what we were asking for. I think for the
20 Department to try and go to the Assembly with a bid, 10:16
21 not knowing what was coming behind it, and not knowing
22 what priorities to give what and how to face it,
23 I think it would be very difficult to move the whole
24 thing forward in bits. So I think there probably was a
25 justifiable reason for holding fire until an action 10:16
26 plan could be based on the whole schema.

27 16 Q. Was that driven by a concern that it might have been
28 difficult to get all of the funding, the money, in
29 place or am I being unnecessarily narrow there? Were

1 there other considerations at play above and beyond
2 money?

3 A. I can't be sure what was in the Department's mind, but
4 at the very least they had to make a bid and that bid
5 had to be justifiable and justified. So they needed an 10:17
6 evidence base to make a bid for an uplift in what
7 was -- in what was then that that comprehensive
8 spending Review that mental health and learning
9 disability would be given a priority.

10 17 Q. But they had to go together? 10:17

11 A. It would make a better case if they could see the
12 enormity of what they were asking for.

13 18 Q. Again I'm asking you to employ hindsight, I accept
14 that, but we know now and looking back on circumstances
15 with 2003 eyes that there's a clearer understanding 10:17
16 that, I think, you've hinted at it, that mental health
17 can often, and related needs and issues, are often, not
18 always, but often more acute and urgent in nature.
19 Whereas, as you averted to, learning disability is
20 whole life, people with learning disabilities have 10:18
21 needs that are lifelong and cover the entirety of their
22 circumstances. So they are coming from two quite
23 different directions.

24

25 But we can see then that when Equal Lives, which was 10:18
26 the focus, if I understand it correctly, of the reviews
27 working on learning disability it took its place as
28 only one Committee then among a number. I'm not
29 seeking to minimise it, but it took it's place as one

1 of a number of work-streams they the Review had.

2
3 Might there have been a case at an earlier stage for
4 saying the enormity of learning disability and related
5 needs and the fact that people are spending so much of 10:18
6 their lives in hospital requires us to go back to the
7 drawing board at an early stage and examine learning
8 disability and related needs separately?

9 A. I think a case can be made. I was conscious of the
10 tensions at the time and I think a sense of 10:19
11 disappointment coming from colleagues in learning
12 disability that there would be a delay. I think it
13 would have been difficult for the Department to
14 kick-start one, for the reasons I've given.

15 CHAIRMAN: Can I just ask so that I understand this: 10:19
16 The Bamford Review I think started effectively in 2002.

17 A. That's right.

18 CHAIRMAN: The Equal Lives Report was in 2005. The
19 last report was the Reform and Modernisation of Mental
20 Health Services which was published in 2007. Was that 10:19
21 the last report?

22 A. Well Social Inclusion Report. I think the Social, I've
23 forgotten the name of it. Our legislation report was
24 2007, there was one other report came in from that.

25 CHAIRMAN: Are you saying that the wheels of the 10:20
26 Department couldn't start turning until this last
27 report was in?

28 A. Can you...

29 CHAIRMAN: That the Department couldn't start moving on

1 any of the recommendations in any of your reports until
2 the very last report was in, is that what you're
3 saying?

4 A. I'm noting that that was what happened and that was
5 their decision. I think it has a defence of the kind 10:20
6 I have tried to present on its behalf.

7
8 The equity issues, for example, the Adult Mental Health
9 Report, which I chaired, came out, it was the first
10 report, it came out just shortly before Equal Lives. 10:20
11 We didn't ask, for example, that adult mental health
12 should be taken forward as a first priority. We knew
13 we had to wait until children and elderly were
14 considered.

15 CHAIRMAN: I'm not, and this is not meant to be 10:21
16 critical, it is genuinely meant to simply understand
17 and what you are saying is that until the Department
18 could see the whole package, the bid, as it were,
19 couldn't be made?

20 A. I think so. 10:21

21 CHAIRMAN: I see. Okay.

22 A. I think it's defensible. But I can understand the
23 passion on the part of people with learning
24 disabilities seeing they got hooked with us. I think
25 the counterargument was, I think we had a momentum 10:21
26 created by the sheer force of the two processes
27 together and the budgetary bids ultimately for the two
28 are not so dissimilar. In fact, the mental health side
29 is slightly larger and then there was health promotion

1 and legislation again. It's about managing change
2 across a big sector.

3 19 Q. Yes. I suppose that's what I was sort of hoping to get
4 your illumination on, given the size of the task was
5 there consideration at any juncture to saying this is 10:22
6 so enormous that it is going to require its own
7 separate review or examination, or was it always going
8 to be a situation where the two had to return together.
9 I think what you are telling the Inquiry is the latter
10 was the case for a number of reasons, most of which are 10:22
11 financial in nature?

12 A. Yes. And I think another issue that I think will come
13 up again and again is the infrastructure issues, like
14 workforce.

15 20 Q. Yes? 10:22

16 A. Not just costings. We needed a workforce strategy and
17 I think it would not be logical to have a separate
18 workforce strategy. The agenda was similar, training
19 and supervision, support, change of profile, retraining
20 staff. So I think there's a justification if you think 10:23
21 of the infrastructure side.

22 21 Q. Maybe an opportunity to discuss the workforce strategy,
23 actually, in due course, in the course of the morning,
24 Professor.
25 10:23

26 In terms of your section headed "The Overview of the
27 Bamford Review and Subsequent Developments", there's
28 quite a bold statement at the outset of paragraph 10
29 where you tell us that the reality is that if the

1 proposals from the Bamford Review have been implemented
2 then Muckamore Abbey Hospital would not have existed in
3 2017, other than as a potentially small acute
4 assessment and treatment facility for which there were
5 always, in all likelihood, be a requirement in Northern 10:23
6 Ireland. As you point out then, Recommendation 27 of
7 the Equal Lives Review in June 2011, all people living
8 in a learning disability hospital should be relocated
9 to the community.

10
11 The reason why I suggest it's bold is that there are a
12 number of things that I would welcome your comment on
13 for the Inquiry's purposes. Was there any active
14 cognizance on the part of your team, the whole team or
15 as far as you're able to speak to it the Equal Lives 10:24
16 team, to a risk, heightened or otherwise, of abuse in a
17 hospital such as Muckamore?

18 A. My impression, and I think I picked this up from Roy
19 McConkey who has a much greater depth of appreciation
20 of the Equal Lives situation as an expert. 10:24

21 22 Q. Yes.

22 A. There was some acknowledgment but it was not a major
23 issue on the agenda and there are one or two references
24 in the Equal Lives Report to abuse of potential risk
25 situations. I think it refers to children and home 10:25
26 situations. But the issue of needing to move to the
27 community to prevent abuse and to get that moving in
28 2005 wasn't a lever or an argument.

29 23 Q. Yes, or as a driver as sometimes the jargon has it.

1 The Inquiry might be interested to know whether there's
2 a reason why a risk of abuse or potential for abuse to
3 arise in a hospital such as Muckamore wasn't on the
4 radar, either of the totality of the Bamford team or of
5 the Equal Lives Review in particular? 10:25

6 A. I'm sure experts in learning disability, as in mental
7 health, are aware of abuse. I don't think it was,
8 I mean given the many, many conversations we've had,
9 there was any belief that the status quo was a major
10 source of a problem that was around us in terms of a 10:26
11 potential abuse.

12 24 Q. Can you explain that a bit more?

13 A. The dominant agenda was improving the quality of lives,
14 it wasn't preventing bad things happening.

15 25 Q. Yes? 10:26

16 A. It wasn't that there was, you know, an ongoing sense of
17 bad things are happening in our mental hospitals, in
18 our long-stay mental hospitals, because long-stay is
19 long-stay, or there's bad things happening in our
20 hospitals. The problems with these institutions is 10:27
21 institutionalism and the lack of normalisation and
22 quality of life for people with long-stay mental health
23 and long-stay learning disabilities. It is the same
24 situation if you want to transform and normalise. It
25 may be abuse in the sense it is social deprivation -- 10:27

26 26 Q. Yes, it takes a number of different forms, of course.
27 Yes.

28 A. But it's not physical abuse or sexual abuse, active
29 abuse, it is passive abuse in the sense that people are

1 just left to stay in large numbers, in large wards,
2 without proper social activities.

3 27 Q. Yes. So, I mean, as far as the Inquiry then can take
4 it, while the term itself might not have been broad in
5 your minds, are you saying that there was a cognizance 10:27
6 of a more sort of institutional or, I'm just trying to
7 get a sense of the awareness of risk that there was,
8 I know you say that this was all about positive and
9 engendering positive change and movement. But I'm just
10 trying to get a sense of the extent to which there was 10:28
11 any awareness of risk, nevertheless, of, as you put
12 them, bad things happening?

13 A. If there were, it would be stated in the Equal Lives
14 Report. I'm not aware of that in the Objectives or
15 anything else. So I don't think it is a major factor. 10:28
16 And it wasn't mine in the sense that I Chaired the
17 Adult Mental Health side and it wasn't a factor in
18 driving us for change. So we were dealing with
19 long-stay as well as all the acute.

20 28 Q. I began my questions just on this particular issue by 10:28
21 describing your statement at the outset about the
22 reality of the implementation of your proposals in
23 terms of Muckamore leading to its closure. One of the
24 reasons why I said it could be described as bold is
25 because, presumably, there would have had to have been 10:29
26 a process of public consultation in relation to the
27 Bamford Review. Was that a factor that was in your
28 team's thinking that, you know, we're coming up with
29 these proposals, huge amounts of paperwork, huge

1 amounts of detail, enormous numbers of very detailed
2 recommendations, but the Department are going to put
3 this out to the public at some stage. Was there a
4 cognizance and an appreciation of that?

5 A. I believe so. One of David Bamford's great 10:29
6 achievements with the Bamford Review was this
7 inclusivity. He really ensured participation from a
8 very wide range of stakeholders. The Review itself I
9 think cost over £1.5 million pounds. It was because of
10 that broad inclusivity and able to use the resources to 10:30
11 get that, that I think a lot of the consultation work
12 was created in the very Bamford Reports themselves.

13
14 So the Department had a very comfortable situation if
15 they went with the Bamford Review and what you tend to 10:30
16 find with the discussions the Department was having
17 with the Assembly was a kind of acceptance and a buy-in
18 to Bamford. It was known as the Bamford Proposal and
19 the Bamford Review and that language became quite
20 conversational. There wasn't a big sell. A lot of the 10:30
21 connectivity with the community, particularly the
22 service users and their families, they were onboard,
23 they were part of the process and they were strong
24 voices. But there was consultation.

25 29 Q. In terms of the make-up of the Review Team itself, 10:31
26 I think you listed in your statement, I think there
27 were 22, correct me, there might be 22 members drawn
28 from all sorts of backgrounds, professional
29 experiences, the police, clinicians, so on and so

1 forth. were there any actual, or was there any input,
2 I know in Equal Lives there's reference made to a User
3 Group?

4 A. Yes.

5 30 Q. But what was the extent of the input in terms of the 10:31
6 Review Team itself from people with learning
7 disabilities, just picking up on that inclusivity
8 thing?

9 A. Yes. Are you referring to the Equal Lives Committee?

10 31 Q. The Bamford Review itself more broadly, if you can? 10:31

11 A. We had service user representation and carer input to
12 the Bamford Review. I know we had a mental health
13 service user. We had Joanne, yes, she was a learning
14 disabilities service user, she was on our Committee.
15 And we would have had a family member at least from 10:32
16 both mental health and learning disability and they
17 were all connected to their support organisations that
18 were in the respective bits of the Review. I say
19 that's all to David's credit, it was a very inclusive
20 process. 10:32

21 32 Q. Nevertheless, you continue by telling us then in the
22 fullness of time --

23 CHAIRMAN: Can you give us the paragraph? Can I just
24 say, my transcript isn't working, I don't know if
25 anybody else's is, it's extremely frustrating. 10:32

26 I raised this with the Secretary to the Inquiry. So
27 apologies to everybody. There will be a transcript at
28 the end, I assume, that we can actually save but it
29 means that nobody can mark-up what's happening. So it

1 would help us, I think, Mr. McEvoy, if you could take
2 us to the paragraph number that you are referring to.
3 I know we also have the facility to put that up on
4 screen.

5 MR. McEVOY BL: That might be helpful, if that can be 10:33
6 done.

7 CHAIRMAN: So if you can give us the paragraph number
8 again?

9 MR. McEVOY BL: I was at paragraph 10 which is where we
10 just left and then we are moving to paragraph 11 then, 10:33
11 which will be on 083-3.

12 CHAIRMAN: Once we get it up, and there we go, right,
13 that's going to help everybody. Thank you.

14 MR. McEVOY BL: We just touched on paragraph 10, if we
15 can move down to paragraph 11. Thank you. 10:33

16
17 You tell us in 11 then that central Government and the
18 Department did not or was not able to make available
19 the required financial resources and to properly,
20 effectively, and fully implement the comprehensive 10:34
21 proposals that were developed through the Bamford
22 Review, which would have seen services fundamentally
23 reshaped so people did not live in a learning
24 disability hospital.

25 10:34
26 You mentioned then the interview you did with the
27 because about that and your description of it as a
28 "chronic disappointment". Can you venture a reason,
29 you have made your observation plain there, but can you

1 venture a reason or an explanation as to why the
2 resources weren't forthcoming?

3 A. Yes, I can.

4 33 Q. Now is your opportunity to venture it.

5 A. Can I refer to my own notes because they are... 10:34

6 34 Q. We don't have the notes available. We'll take them in
7 due course but nobody else has seen them, Professor, so
8 we don't know what it is you are referring to?

9 A. I need to guide my thinking.

10 35 Q. I defer to the Chair, but it's not usual. 10:35

11 A. I see.

12 CHAIRMAN: I think if we can keep going as we are at
13 the moment. Any notes can be distributed. Everybody
14 has to be able to see them.

15 36 Q. MR. McEVOY BL: Thank you, Chair. I appreciate you may 10:35
16 not be able to give an enormous amount of detail, but
17 if you want to give us --

18 A. I'll speak, the notes are there, they give a more
19 thorough.

20 37 Q. If you can summarise that would be very helpful. 10:35

21 A. Yes indeed. The Department's Action Plan for 2012 to
22 '15 is a very useful document because it provides a
23 review of the progress-to-date for the first phase of
24 the implementation. That's the '8/'9 years through to
25 '10/'11 years, the three years. In that they state 10:35
26 that there was additional funding identified for
27 learning disability totalling £17 million. However, by
28 2010/'11, the effects of the public sector funding
29 crisis was starting to bite and the amount committed to

1 learning disability was reduced to 12.

2
3 However, very helpfully, they go on to say that the
4 Trust's actual spend on learning disability over that
5 first three-year period was considerably more and 10:36
6 totalled £39.88 million. That was a very welcome
7 priming of reform and modernisation.

8
9 They go on to say in the 2012-15 Action Plan Report:

10
11 "However, the problems with funding remain severe and 10:36
12 that for the forthcoming Action Plan period the amount
13 available for learning disability is £6.9 million."

14
15 For me, that was a catastrophic drop. It wasn't just a 10:37
16 low investment, it was a drop. And if I can use the
17 analogy of a train going up a hill out of a station,
18 the Bamford train had moved and it was running out of
19 steam, it was running out of fuel and was at risk of
20 not only coming to a stop but its own braking power 10:37
21 would be slowed up and the risk of going backwards. I
22 mean this was a very bad stressor on the system. Only
23 part of the stressor, I should add, but that was the
24 financial component of the stressor.

25
26 Combined with that was the Department's exclusive 10:38
27 requirement that that funding would be used exclusively
28 for resettlement. While on the one hand that might
29 sound a relief that at least it would deal with some of

1 the resettlement issues, the problem is that there was
2 no more money to do anything with anything else,
3 including the development needs of in-patient settings,
4 including Muckamore Abbey itself.

5 38 Q. I was about to ask you what the implications of that 10:38
6 were, so the resettlement money was to be used once
7 patients were outside the confines of the hospital?

8 A. Yes. Yes.

9 39 Q. So what was the predicament then for people inside it, 10:38
10 I think that's where you were going?

11 A. Indeed so. The predicament is the predicament for
12 management. I have to refer to a document that's in my
13 notes. Do you mind if I actually refer to it?

14 CHAIRMAN: No, no, of course you can. We'll see them
15 in due course. 10:39

16 A. This gives a measure of the commitment, positive
17 commitment that is from the Northern Ireland Housing
18 Executive. This is a report to the Northern Ireland
19 Housing Executive entitled: The Hospital Resettlement
20 Programme in Northern Ireland after the Bamford Review. 10:39

21 CHAIRMAN: Is this not one of your exhibits, no?

22 A. It may not be.

23 CHAIRMAN: All right.

24 A. I'm quoting from this, as follows, at paragraph 2.2.5: 10:39
25

26 "Participants in the consultative interviews that took
27 place as part of the research said that the new
28 resettlement plans and new structures agreed in 2011
29 and starting on 1 April 2012 were critically important:

- 1 1. A new Performance Management Framework was put in
2 place.
3
- 4 2. A revamp Programme Delivery Board was established. 10:40
5
- 6 3. Annual resettlement targets were set for each
7 Trust.
8
- 9 4. Trust performance was monitored regularly and they
10 were held accountable for meeting their targets. 10:40
11
- 12 5. Trusts were required to make a monthly progress
13 report to the Board.
14
- 15 6. Progress was reviewed by the Programme Delivery 10:40
16 Board with reports to the Minister. "
17
- 18 Now that's very good for the output end, for the people
19 who were going into the community, but you can imagine
20 the Trust's attention. There's no funding for anything 10:40
21 else and there's an intense performance management
22 framework about delivering the outcome on patient
23 delivery.
24
- 25 So while they were trying to settle patients, the 10:40
26 likelihood was that there would be very limited
27 attention paid to the in-patient setting and the
28 welfare of patients while you're doing all this,
29 getting patients into the community. If you're not on

1 that boat out, there's a problem.

2 40 Q. Indeed that's something you say, and perhaps just
3 moving down to paragraph 12, if we can? The second and
4 third sentences, in fact. Something that you have,
5 I think, foreshadowed with what you have told us. The 10:41
6 Inquiry will, no doubt, want to consider the effect of
7 running a run a learning disability hospital whilst at
8 the same time resettle from it the patients who reside
9 in, and further, the Inquiry will also want to consider
10 the affect of the process of resettlement where the 10:41
11 most complex patients are those that are left behind to
12 be cared for in the learning disability hospital.
13

14 You volunteer your assistance in terms of wanting to
15 explain, or being prepared to explain a bit more about 10:41
16 what you mean by that. I mean, picking up on that
17 theme of what the implications might be for those left
18 behind in the hospital, you've said that those are or
19 were some of the most complex patients?

20 A. That's correct. I mean, as well as the intentional 10:42
21 factor on management, there's the change in the milieu.

22 41 Q. So, can you tell us a bit more about what you mean by
23 that? The Panel Members will understand obviously, but
24 the layperson may not. So maybe if you can explain
25 that in a bit more detail that might be very helpful. 10:42
26 A. When one's doing resettlement work, typically it's
27 simplest to start with patients with the least complex
28 needs. They're easier to resettle and the options are
29 available, so the whole thing moves more easily.

1 That's a process that just keeps working its way
2 through until you have fewer and fewer people needing
3 to be resettled. But as you go down through that
4 process, it's not an alphabetical list, it's a list of
5 complexities. You're dealing with more people with 10:43
6 greater needs and these needs will typically be in the
7 mental health sector, people with mental illness,
8 schizophrenia, severe autism.

9 42 Q. So we're clear, these are people with learning
10 disabilities but may also have a mental health need in 10:43
11 addition?

12 A. Oh yes, yes. And this will include behavioural
13 problems, much more severe. You're getting a
14 concentration of this. I think it's also worth noting
15 that the staffing of learning disability hospitals is 10:43
16 by learning disability nurses, they're not mental
17 health nurses. They are not really trained as mental
18 health nurses. So the skill mix is not necessarily
19 optimal for this kind of situation. So unless there's
20 a training programme moving the needs, addressing the 10:44
21 needs of staff to meet the needs of the patients, then
22 there is risks of mismanagement.

23 43 Q. Yes. That is a little bit earlier why I mentioned to
24 you the concept of risk awareness within Bamford. When
25 we get to this point in time in which you gave the 10:44
26 interview to the because, I'm not just asking about it,
27 but the concerns that were broad in your mind at that
28 time, was there, to your knowledge, an effort on the
29 part of the Trust to go to central Government and say,

1 we have an issue here, we are able to resettle the
2 people with the least level of need, but as a matter of
3 almost logic, we're going to be left with the most
4 needy patients in, if that's a word, in the hospital.
5 What are you going to do to help us because there are 10:44
6 going to be issues? Was that message transmitted to
7 central Government?

8 A. I wasn't aware of that message going back up to
9 Government. I mean, the direction the Department was
10 giving was quite clear and the Performance Management 10:45
11 Framework that I referred to gives you a feel for the
12 sense of direction and the Department's exclusive
13 allocation of any funding. It wasn't saying you must
14 be aware to use some of this funding for back-up
15 because the consequences of what we're trying to do. 10:45
16 So I don't think there was the insight in the system at
17 the time. You could say even Bamford failed to have
18 reflected on what could happen if things go wrong. So
19 I'm saying there's a responsibility backing up on all
20 of us here. Could we have foreseen this? We were 10:45
21 looking forward but we weren't looking over our
22 shoulder at "what if."

23 44 Q. Yes. On the nursing issue, you had mentioned that
24 learning disability nurses deal with patients with
25 learning disabilities. I suppose in the ideal world 10:46
26 mental health trained nurses deal with those with those
27 with mental health needs. Do you know, if you don't
28 know, if you're not familiar with the detail, but do
29 you know what the picture was in Muckamore at that time

1 or what the impression at the management level was of
2 what was being done in terms of the provision of
3 adequately trained nurses or appropriately trained
4 nurses according to need.

5
6 I think Dr. Maxwell may have a question on that issue.

7 MR. MAXWELL: I think on this question about nursing
8 you make a very good point, but I think it could be
9 argued the mental health nurses don't understand
10 learning disabilities so what actually is needed is a
11 duly trained nurse.

12 A. That's exactly right.

13 DR. MAXWELL: I know you are going to come on to the
14 workforce plan because I haven't seen it mentioned
15 there, but I suppose the question you're asking what
16 I would like to drill down to is, do you know if there
17 were any duly trained LD and mental health nurses at
18 Muckamore?

19 A. I know talking to one of my consultant colleagues who
20 was working in Muckamore Abbey as a consultant up until
21 about 2009 until she retired, she worked quite hard
22 involving colleagues in bringing training into nurses.
23 Like, Lord Alderdice used to do psychotherapy training
24 with some of the staff. So they skill them up in the
25 mental health field, but as far as I can see there
26 wasn't a formal dual trained nurse calibre in the
27 system formally at that time.

28 DR. MAXWELL: It's my understanding that neither of the
29 Universities do a shortened course. So, for example,

1 if a registered nurse wanted to train as a midwife,
2 it's a shortened course. I'm not aware in Northern
3 Ireland of any way that a mental health nurse could do
4 a shortened LD course or vice versa.

5 A. Yes, a work strategy would have been an issue to look 10:48
6 into this, wouldn't it?

7 DR. MAXWELL: I know you are coming on to that later.

8 MR. McEVOY BL: Dr. Maxwell was going exactly where
9 I was going in terms of a practice working of one of
10 the messages; the Trust, that is to say, might have 10:48
11 transmitted back to the Department which is to say, you
12 know, there are going to be pressing needs if we are
13 left in Muckamore with patients with the greatest level
14 of need. One of the practical needs we may have is a
15 need for duly trained nurses. 10:48

16 A. Yes.

17 45 Q. But I think we can take it that that message, and
18 we don't know whether it was transmitted but
19 we certainly...

20 A. I know nothing of it. The silence is... 10:48

21 46 Q. Again, hindsight is 2020-vision, but would that have
22 been a very practical message that might have been
23 appropriate to have transmitted?

24 A. I would have thought in an ideal world that the
25 Department flagging the risks and making sure some 10:49
26 allowance was made, the funding crisis created a
27 problem for everybody.

28 47 Q. Yes?

29 A. I mean it slowed the process. So the assumption was

1 that by 2012 most people would have been out of
2 hospital. So it was almost over before any issues
3 could have arise, it was happening. I think it was to
4 get it out, get people moving quickly.

5 48 Q. But as we know, although in terms of numbers, there was 10:49
6 a reduction in numbers of bodies, that is to say of
7 patients, was not the same as the level of need and the
8 imperative to ensure that the need that was --

9 A. That's right.

10 49 Q. -- the need be met for those remaining? I was going to 10:49
11 ask, and maybe we will just clarify the point in terms
12 of paragraph 16, you discussed the Terms of Reference.
13 If you come down to 16 there. I had asked you about
14 the inclusivity. If you look halfway down the
15 paragraph you say: 10:50

16
17 "Widespread consultations with stakeholders endorsed
18 our vision on the strategic direction of the review. A
19 feature of the review process...".

20
21 CHAIRMAN: Can you slow down a little bit please,
22 otherwise the transcript is never going to be right.
23 Sorry, I know you are reading.

24 MR. McEVOY BL:

25
26 "Widespread consultations with stakeholders endorsed
27 our vision on the strategic direction of the review. A
28 feature of the review process was a contribution of
29 users and carers across both mental health and Learning

1 disability. Their insights, advice and guidance were
2 very important. The recommendations that we made for
3 service reform were underpinned by a sound economic
4 appraisal carried out by our Needs and Resources
5 Committee."

10:51

6
7 We have touched on the inclusivity in terms of the
8 nature of the Review and the people that it heard from.
9 In terms of the economic appraisal, I think earlier on
10 you indicated at the outset that this was something
11 that you were concerned to respond to and what
12 professor McConkey said to the Inquiry last week.
13 One of the points that was made to Professor McConkey
14 and it came from Dr. Maxwell was about staffing costs
15 and support staff and, you know, the economy of
16 staffing costs and having larger facilities. The
17 question was really around whether there was an
18 examination of the ongoing revenue costs of staffing.

10:51

10:51

19
20 Professor McConkey said that he, in retrospect, said,
21 and I'm summarising, he said that in that respect and
22 upon reflection that if he were asked what were some of
23 the shortcomings of the Equal Lives Review, he thinks
24 there was insufficient attention paid to value for
25 money. He said that in that respect the costs of the
26 long-stay hospital, any evidence we could gather on
27 those costs and, indeed, it was very hard to extract
28 from the Trust how much money was being spent on
29 long-stay accommodation. This was something that was

10:52

10:52

1 in his mind.

2 A. Yes.

3 50 Q. Is this something on which you have a view having heard
4 that, and given what you say about the underpinning of
5 the Bamford recommendations by a sound economic -- 10:53

6 A. Yes, indeed, I would like to comment on that. I think
7 the impression Professor McConkey, for whom I have the
8 highest regard, may have given, perhaps
9 unintentionally, that there was insufficient attention
10 being given to the costs of what we were trying to do 10:53
11 and sort of, by implication, that we were at risk of
12 creating a wish-list.

13

14 while our estimates of the recommendations individually
15 and cumulatively for the Equal Lives Report may have 10:53
16 been inaccurate, we did give the matter very serious
17 attention. I think in support of that view, I would
18 like to draw the Inquiry's attention to the Strategic
19 Priorities Report, which I do think you have.

20 51 Q. I think if I can, hopefully, maybe get it pulled up on 10:54
21 screen, it can be found at 1477, hopefully.

22 A. Thank you very much. At page 24 --

23 52 Q. Internal page 24?

24 A. Yes of that, we provide a section on infrastructure
25 issues. 10:54

26 53 Q. That page there, Professor?

27 A. That's it, yes. It states there that:

28

29 "The Review, as a whole and its first phase, depend on

1 a number of underpinning elements and processes."

2
3 At page 25 we note that:

4
5 "The proposed Programme of Modernisation and Reform has 10:55
6 significant implementations for revenue and capital."

7
8 Then at page 25, sorry, 26, we propose --

9 CHAIRMAN: Hold on. Let us just find it so that we can
10 actually see it on the screen. Can you see the screen 10:55
11 yourself?

12 A. I can, indeed.

13 CHAIRMAN: It says "we propose".

14 A. Yes, "we propose", there it is:

15
16 "We propose as a first step to fulfilling the vision 10:56
17 for services as set out in our reports that an
18 investment strategy be agreed by the Northern Ireland
19 Assembly and/or direct rule administration."

20
21 I should add that in the course of Bamford through to 10:56
22 implementation phase of the legislation of 2016 we had
23 six changes of Minister to deal with, including,
24 I believe, two Direct Rule Ministers. So the situation
25 in Government is not insignificant in this process. So 10:56
26 we had to keep saying, whether it would be the Assembly
27 or a direct rule administration:

28
29 "...address the present funding gap, to pump prime the

1 reform process and to provide Northern Ireland with the
2 resources needed to achieve equivalence with the other
3 jurisdictions."

4
5 Then at the very end, at the very last sentence:

10:56

6
7 "An analysis of the issues and costings of the Bamford
8 Review are presented at Annex 10."

9
10 Can I take you to Annex 10 at page 139, internal
11 page 139.

10:57

12 MR. McEVOY BL: Just bear with us for a moment, just
13 while we get it.

14 A. Thank you very much. This is described as "The Costs
15 Needs and Future Investment". This piece of work was
16 carried out by a Needs and Resources Committee.
17 Bamford established this. So we had this aspect of the
18 infrastructure of the Review taken care of by people
19 considered in their own field experts, Board Officials
20 from the Trusts, people with a knowledge of accounting
21 in the Services and how to cost services, because we
22 were not capable of costing it ourselves.

10:58

10:59

23
24 So at paragraph 1.2 it states here that the remit of
25 the Needs and Resources Committee is to investigate and
26 report on the following:

10:59

27
28 "Current funding for health and personal social
29 services for mental health and Learning disability.

1 Impact of need and resource allocation formula.
2
3 Spending by other Government Departments on mental
4 health and Learning disability. "
5 10:59
6 Fourthly, most importantly:
7
8 "Costs of the recommendations of the Bamford Review."
9
10 In parenthesis it states: 10:59
11
12 "(By agreement with a Steering Group for the Bamford
13 Review, the remit of the Needs and Resources Committee
14 was extended to look at issues associated with the
15 requirements for additional investment in services)." 11:00
16
17 Further down on that page, at 1.3, it notes that in
18 addressing its remit, the Needs and Resources Committee
19 was conscious that a number of reports had already been
20 produced. At 1.4 it states: 11:00
21
22 "These reports were submitted as evidence and taken
23 into consideration."
24
25 At 1.5: 11:00
26
27 "The report summarises the recommendations of the
28 earlier publications and provides estimated costs for
29 the recommendations arising from the Bamford Review."

1 Finally, over at 1.6 on page 140:

2
3 "Any comparative investment figures referenced in the
4 report were correct as at 31st December 2006."

5
6 Now, what I would like finally to ask the Committee is
7 to go to the Conclusions regarding disability funding.
8 This is first based on comparative data at
9 paragraph 2.30 at page 150.

10 CHAIRMAN: It is our 1627, I think.

11 A. If you go to 2.30, paragraph 2.30. That's it. Thank
12 you very much. If I can just read this to you:

13
14 "Overall, the Northern Ireland spend on health and
15 personal social services for learning disability should
16 rise by 20% to bring it up to the English per capita
17 spend, and then be increased by a further 59% to take
18 account of the differences in need, making a total
19 requirement of an additional 79% uplift."

20
21 Okay. So that's based on a comparison with England and
22 then taking account of our needs. But the second
23 estimate they did was based on the actual
24 recommendations of Bamford itself and these two figures
25 need to be kept in mind. This is given just on the
26 next page, Table 7, page 151. You'll see the figure of
27 £173 million. That is a 109% increase. The
28 comparative figure is 79. It's significantly higher.
29 The reason it's higher is that we weren't simply trying

1 to do what England had done, England was trying to
2 improve its situation, we were trying to improve ours
3 from a much worse baseline. So we were setting the
4 standard as to where we wanted to get to and that was
5 what we thought we needed.

11:03

6
7 I think the Needs and Resources Group did an excellent
8 piece of work in trying to help us to cost what might
9 have been seen otherwise as a wish-list. I felt that
10 point needs to be clarified. We may not have got it
11 right, but I think before we ever ran out of funding
12 because we had underestimated, we ran out of money
13 because of the public spending crisis, the public
14 funding crisis.

11:03

15 54 Q. That figure of £173 million, I suppose to go back to
16 the point about the consequence or the extent to which
17 attention was paid to the emptying of the hospitals,
18 Muckamore included, how much, was that a factor in the
19 calculation of that figure?

11:03

20 A. Well, it was already impacting when you recognised
21 £39 million had gone into the first three years.

11:04

22 55 Q. Yes.

23 A. That's well-on-target for this kind of figure. But
24 that drops to 6.9. It's told you can only spend it on
25 resettlement.

11:04

26 CHAIRMAN: Can I just understand what that figure
27 really represents. I may be the only one in the room
28 who doesn't quite understand. The total figure is
29 £173 million going forward. But what period does that

1 cover, because you are talking about looking after
2 these patients for X number of years.

3 A. Yes.

4 CHAIRMAN: Is this an investment figure?

5 A. This is a lift of the recurrent spend. 11:04

6 CHAIRMAN: Right.

7 A. So the spend around this time may have been around,
8 say, two-hundred-million. Well, we know it is slightly
9 less than that.

10 CHAIRMAN: Annual spend. 11:04

11 A. Annual spend. The 173 represents that 109% uplift.

12 CHAIRMAN: Right. And that you reckoned, in effect, as
13 a Committee, would have met, or it would have allowed
14 the Department to meet all of your recommendations in
15 terms of learning disability? 11:05

16 A. There was our assumption.

17 CHAIRMAN: Right, okay. Sorry, I just needed to
18 encapsulate that. Thank you.

19 MR. McEVOY BL: That figure is based on prices as
20 indicated there in 2004 and 2005. Was there built into 11:05
21 that calculation what might happen to pricing going
22 forward?

23 A. I can't be sure, I would hope so, but...

24 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask, you may be coming to
25 this, but I think it is useful to ask now. The 11:05
26 £6.4 million for resettlement, I don't know how many
27 patients that would be expected to cover. Did you have
28 any idea of how many patients that would allow to be
29 resettled?

1 A. Yes. With more complex patients, as you know, the
2 costs are significantly higher. But I know, again,
3 talking to my colleagues recently £80,000 per year, per
4 patient, at least, as a basic starting point. So
5 £6 million isn't a very large sum of money. 11:06
6 CHAIRMAN: Sorry, is that the care costs following
7 settlement?
8 A. Yes. It is simply the care costs on the outside.
9 CHAIRMAN: Right.
10 A. With private sector provision as a dominant model, as 11:06
11 we know it has become, it tends to be much higher. In
12 the Winterbourne Review Inquiry I think it was £150,000
13 per patient.
14 MR. McEVOY BL: Presumably there's going to be
15 considerable variability based on the degree of need? 11:07
16 A. Oh yes, yes. The more, as I say, you go into the more
17 complex patients with greater care needs, the greater
18 the costs.
19 DR. MAXWELL: So the £80,000 is for a lower needs'
20 patient? 11:07
21 A. That was a 2009 estimate that I was given recently.
22 DR. MAXWELL: Right, that was 2009.
23 A. Yes. By 2012, when this is being talked about and
24 we're down to 6.9, that money, that level would
25 probably have gone up quite a bit. 11:07
26 CHAIRMAN: Is that for a lower needs patient? Is that
27 for a patient who needs one-to-one care or...
28 A. I was understanding in 2009 the typical patient being
29 resettled at that time, which would have been a

1 relevantly low-level of need, there were over 200 in
2 long-stay care at that time, I think there was more,
3 I think there was nearer 400.

4 CHAIRMAN: Right.

5 A. Just settling them would cost £80,000. 11:08

6 CHAIRMAN: Okay. I don't know if you are moving on or
7 staying with that, because we have been going about an
8 hour and ten minutes.

9 MR. McEVOY BL: I was just going to propose a break
10 before I move on. I have a slightly different area to 11:08
11 cover now, so it might be an appropriate moment for a
12 brief comfort break.

13 CHAIRMAN: Okay. Thank you very much indeed. We'll
14 take a short break. Again, if you need to discuss your
15 evidence with Mr. McEvoy, please do, I know he will 11:08
16 tell us what the result of that discussion was. Thank
17 you.

18
19 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

20
21 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 11:31

22 MR. McEVOY BL: Thank you, Chair. We were looking at
23 some financial matters and money related matters, and
24 no doubt, given the nature of this Inquiry, we will
25 probably touch on them again a bit later on in the 11:31
26 morning, Professor.

27
28 I wanted to move on, because in your statement, as I
29 said at the outset you have very helpfully broken it

1 down into a number of headings, and in the next section
2 you deal with the Equal Lives Report and you dedicate
3 quite a bit of detail to it. I wanted just to turn to
4 what you said at paragraph 28. Well, really, it is
5 just citing one of the conclusions which are set out in 11:31
6 the outset in fact of the Equal Lives report. If you
7 look at 28, it's the conclusion essentially or the
8 Executive conclusion. 1.11:

9
10 "People with a Learning disability in Northern Ireland 11:32
11 do not enjoy equality of opportunity and are often
12 excluded from the opportunities that other citizens
13 enjoy. Their families frequently often suffer high
14 levels of social disadvantage and their caring
15 requirements responsibilities can place them under 11:32
16 almost unbearable levels of stress. There is evidence
17 of progress having been made, but in order to fully
18 tackle these difficulties there is a need for major
19 coordinated developments in support and services and a
20 continuing change in attitudes over at least the next 11:32
21 15 years. We believe this will best be achieved
22 through the adoption of a shared value base, a focus on
23 shared core objectives and rigorous efforts across
24 Government Departments and Agencies in the community to
25 implement a change agenda that is detailed in the 11:32
26 Equal Lives review."

27
28 would it be fair to describe that as something that was
29 or ought to have been a watershed moment for persons

1 with learning disabilities in Northern Ireland?

2 A. Yes, indeed. Again, Roy McConkey last week, I think,
3 conveyed the spirit of enthusiasm and general uplift
4 that everybody felt from not just the work, but the way
5 it was worked, the inclusivity and the sense of 11:33
6 togetherness. I felt it myself when I met, as I often
7 did, with the Groups at various events. So it was a
8 moment of great hope.

9 56 Q. I was about to ask you whether you shared the sense of
10 optimism that he described when the report was 11:33
11 published?

12 A. Yes. I mean this, across the Review, there was a great
13 sense of hope. Not -- hope is not all lost by the way,
14 but it was a great moment.

15 57 Q. Yes. You go on I think, and if you bring up 11:33
16 paragraph 32, you go on to describe and mention, and
17 make reference to a report from the then Department of
18 Health and Social Services from 1995. The reference
19 that is made to it, indeed, in Equal Lives Review. If
20 I can just read out, maybe, the conclusion or the 11:34
21 excerpt, sorry, from the Equal Lives Review which is
22 included. It is 3.9. So it appears at the bottom,
23 sorry, just midway through really. Page 32, yes.

24

25 "It should be noted, however, that much of the evidence 11:34
26 presented to the Learning Disability Working Committee
27 indicates that these aspirational statements have not
28 been fully translated into practice. In particular,
29 the review of policy and services for people with a

1 learning disability 1995, pointed the way towards many
2 of the changes that we are again highlighting in this
3 report. The failure to fully implement the
4 recommendations of that Review appears to stem from a
5 combination of the following factors." 11:35

6
7 So although the Equal Lives Review is published with a
8 sense of optimism and hope, there is a recognition that
9 there has been an attempt at a Departmental level to at
10 least look at these issues before, this is about 11:35
11 10 years beforehand.

12 A. That's right.

13 58 Q. And there is a failure, an acknowledged failure, that
14 the Equal Lives Review notes.

15 11:35
16 Now, in due course the Panel will, obviously, want to
17 consider how that might have impacted on matters within
18 the terms of reference. But the factors that you have
19 set out in the bullet points within 32, paragraph 32
20 there, the bullet points from the Equal Lives Review 11:35
21 itself. Can I ask you for your comment, if I can take
22 you to them in turn and any comment you might have in
23 relation to each of them. The first one is:

24
25 "Insufficient resources to build up the community 11:36
26 infrastructure, including community-based alternatives
27 to hospitals required to deliver on the strategic
28 intent."
29

1 Is there anything you would say about that?

2 A. The need was very obvious. For those already living in
3 the community there was a lack of resource to support
4 and enhance their quality of life, their inclusivity.
5 The absence of those supports led to greater isolation 11:36
6 and lack of equality and experience. So that Group,
7 which is the larger group, of course, already in the
8 community, are the people living in hospital with more
9 complex needs needing additional resources to help them
10 in the community. We talked about the kinds of costs 11:37
11 involved. So having cost the amount, roughly,
12 hopefully, semi-accurately, you get a sense of the
13 resource need and the insufficiency at that point
14 there.

15 59 Q. The next factor that is mentioned is: 11:37
16
17 "A lack of robust implementation mechanisms to hold all
18 Government Departments and Agencies to account for
19 their actions in implementing the recommendations."
20 11:37

21 Is there anything you would add to that?

22 A. Well the need for a coordinated implementation plan was
23 so obvious, that was one of the reasons we had this
24 priorities document, to spell out some of the
25 infrastructure issues, resourcing being only one of 11:38
26 them. Only the Department could lead on that.

27 60 Q. Yes.
28 CHAIRMAN: Can I just ask, did you work out any system
29 as to how to hold a Government Department to account

1 for their actions in implementing any recommendation?
2 I mean, how is it actually done because this is a
3 constant refrain, I think, of reports and enquiries.

4 A. This must be the \$64,000 question.

5 DR. MAXWELL: I can add to that, on page 1581 there was 11:38
6 a requirement to set up a Regional Implementation
7 Steering Group for Equal Lives. Did that get
8 established and did it hold any --

9 A. I'm not aware of it.

10 DR. MAXWELL: You don't think it was even established, 11:38
11 even though it was one of the actions?

12 A. No, no. I think that was aspirational. It never got
13 off the ground. But holding the Department to account,
14 and across departmental account, I think this is a
15 very, very important issue. 11:39

16 CHAIRMAN: I understand the complaint. I wondered if
17 you found a solution, you didn't?

18 A. I beg your pardon?

19 CHAIRMAN: I understand the complaint you were making,
20 but I wondered if you found any form of solution. 11:39

21 A. No.

22 CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you. Sorry to interrupt,
23 Mr McEvoy.

24 MR. McEVROY BL: The next factor is something that
25 we have perhaps touched on already, but: 11:39
26
27 "The continued perception that the needs of people with
28 a learning disability can be met solely by Health and
29 Social Services."

1 A. Yes. Well I think this touches at the heart of the
2 values base of Learning Disability Initiative in the
3 Equal Lives Report. The whole normalisation, people
4 using normal housing, aspirations of some sort of
5 useful use of time, even employment opportunities, 11:40
6 recreational opportunities, these are all things
7 outside health and social care. If you are looking for
8 an across-government response, the funding we were
9 referring to of course is mainly in the health and
10 social care domain, so there are issues there. 11:40

11 61 Q. Finally, then:

12
13 "An underdeveloped culture of involving people with a
14 learning disability and family carers in determining
15 the services available to them." 11:40

16 A. Yes. Yes.

17 62 Q. Self-evident, is that --

18 A. Self-evident.

19 63 Q. Okay. So the conclusion then on that particular
20 portion of the Equal Live Reviews is that: 11:41

21
22 "The challenge for the future will be to build on the
23 direction of travel that has been established in these
24 legislative and policy developments, and to learn from
25 lessons of previous reviews to ensure that these 11:41
26 aspirations become a reality within the next 15 years."

27
28 That would have been by 2020 to 2022. In terms of the
29 size of that challenge, just touching on what the Chair

1 had already alluded to in his question, was there
2 consideration given to a means of accountability
3 checking over that period, you have answered the
4 question already, but was there any consideration or
5 scoping about how, you know, recommendations would be 11:41
6 at least checked over, over that foregoing decade and a
7 half, or following decade and a half?

8 A. I was not involved at the later stages. I ceased to be
9 involved directly from about 2011. Once the group of
10 experts set up by the Minister to see the first phase 11:42
11 initiated, really, we were stood down.

12
13 But to its credit, the Department set its own kind of
14 monitoring process which is very transparent in its
15 action reports, particularly the early reports. So, 11:42
16 I think it was conscious that it needed to make itself
17 transparent and accountable to the public at least.

18 64 Q. In terms of the Department, I know you are commenting
19 and giving evidence from the Trust perspective, but in
20 terms of your position as an expert and someone 11:42
21 familiar with all the issues at hand were periods of
22 action, as you perceived it, more activity, in other
23 words from the Department, driven by other factors or
24 were there ulterior factors or outside factors,
25 external factors, that drove activity or inactivity, as 11:43
26 the case may be. I suppose what I'm really driving at
27 is, did periods of direct rule or an Executive bear on
28 activity or inactivity, as the case may be, in terms of
29 taking the recommendations forward?

1 A. My sense of it all was that the Department was very
2 committed and it tried hard to get a significant bid in
3 the comprehensive spending review. It was dumbed-down
4 initially and we needed to challenge it, there was only
5 a few millions was initially offered, then we got it up 11:43
6 to £47 million and our Bamford request was for
7 £54 million, I think, for the first phase.

8 65 Q. What precisely was that money for just so the Inquiry
9 understand?

10 A. That is the total implementation of the first phase of 11:44
11 Bamford.

12 66 Q. The first phase?

13 A. The first phase of the Action Plan. I think the
14 Department was competing with other health demands.
15 But they did manage to increase the commitment 11:44
16 financially significantly, until the Lehman Brothers
17 crisis peculated through the public sector throughout
18 these islands in 2010, '11, and seriously afterwards.

19 67 Q. I suppose to go back to my question, I suppose I was
20 asking whether or not you feel able, and if you don't 11:44
21 I understand, but whether you feel able to comment on
22 whether or not devolution or an absence of it has had
23 an impact on the taking forward of the recommendations?

24 A. I think it -- the Direct Rule Ministers when we were
25 working with Bamford were actually quite successful. 11:45
26 There was, in a sense, ways that they didn't need to
27 have to consult widely with executives and stuff,
28 things happened and we had Sean Woodward for quite a
29 while and that was very successful.

1 68 Q. He was a Direct Rule Minister?
2 A. Direct rule. Yes. Interestingly though, when it came
3 to legislation I was in fear and dread because with the
4 Direct Rule Minister we would be tied to a Westminster
5 view of the legislation which was very much opposed to 11:45
6 anything like fusion legislation. And with devolution
7 ending and David Ford becoming the Minister For Health,
8 who in his day had been a student of David Bamford in
9 social work, with a social work background and mindset,
10 he saw, because it was across departmental -- 11:46
11 69 Q. And just so the Inquiry is aware, David Ford was the
12 Minister for Justice.
13 A. Minister for Justice, and of course Minister McGimpsey
14 at the same time.
15 70 Q. He was the Minister For Health? 11:46
16 A. Minister for Health. I mean, in the present
17 administration it is clearly a hold-up for getting
18 legislation, hold-up for legislation through. And
19 we have two pieces of legislation on the statute books
20 that I would have been associated with coming through 11:46
21 in 2016, still not implemented, one being this "fusion
22 legislation".
23 71 Q. Yes. Coming back then to just Equal Lives.
24 Paragraph 33. This is where a layperson like me is at
25 a disadvantage, the Panel Members will be more 11:46
26 familiar. But I wanted to give you the opportunity to
27 expand a little bit for the uninitiated in terms of
28 what is meant here by some terms. So, the Equal Lives
29 Report did address different models for learning

1 disability care in what was described as a traditional
2 or medical model and the social model. First of all,
3 can you just explain for us what those mean?

4 A. As best I can. I mean the medical model, of course, is 11:47
5 really the idea that you're, you know, you have a
6 patient, me as a patient, whatever, and I have a
7 condition, a diagnosis was made and I need help with
8 that condition and it is treated. It works well for
9 cancer. It worked well for heart disease.

10 72 Q. Yes. Physical ailments, in other words? 11:47

11 A. Yes, it does. But modern medicine recognises that that
12 is a narrow model too. I think modern healthcare and,
13 therefore, modern medical education, for example, needs
14 to be much more holistic and see the person who has
15 responsibility and ownership of their condition. It is 11:48
16 a person, not a disease that you're treating.

17 73 Q. Yes?

18 A. As you move across the spectrum to mental health, that
19 becomes much more of an issue looking at the
20 psychological and the social domain. So the medical 11:48
21 model in psychiatry has expanded to the
22 biopsychosocial.

23 74 Q. Yes?

24 A. Where you see the social context, peoples' living 11:48
25 conditions. We know, for example, how much health is
26 related to equality or inequality no matter what the
27 physical health or mental health. So that is very
28 pertinent in learning disability, where it is not even
29 about disease, it is not even about illness, it is

1 about intellectual vulnerability and limitation. So,
2 what you need is a leg-up in life across the spectrum
3 of housing, recreation, use of time, relationships.
4 75 Q. So, to your knowledge, and when I say to "you", I mean
5 to the Team, to the Team's knowledge, the whole Team's 11:49
6 knowledge, was this something that had ever been done
7 before in terms of this underpinning of the Review's
8 work, the employment of this model, biopsychosocial
9 model?
10 A. I'm not aware, I think it was a personal vision that 11:49
11 they had about inclusivity, kind of a whole person, a
12 whole situation approach. I expect they have been
13 informed by other initiatives elsewhere, and I can't
14 assume that hasn't been the case. But it was a
15 perfectly natural, I mean it was in the air of their 11:50
16 whole attitude to the way they wanted to be different
17 from mental health, and not to be too contaminated by a
18 mental health strategy that was dominating the rest of
19 the review. It was a very person-focused approach to
20 normalisation and socialisation. So it was really a 11:50
21 concentration, a condensing of that philosophy down to
22 that word "biopsychosocial".
23 76 Q. You have very helpfully set out in your statement at
24 paragraph 35, and I am not proposing to go through
25 them, but the recommendations, the areas that they 11:50
26 covered and then the objectives. In other words, you
27 helpfully married-up the objectives and
28 recommendations.
29

1 But what you then tell us at paragraph 37, if I can
2 just bring that up, is the identification of particular
3 difficulties associated with resettlement and the
4 identification of a significant future problem. But
5 the Review, the Equal Lives Report was very clear in 11:51
6 terms of what needed to be done. You have pointed out
7 there Recommendations 27 and 28 of the Review, and
8 Recommendation 27 is by June 2011:

9
10 "All people with a learning disability living in a 11:51
11 hospital should be relocated to the community;
12 Funds need to be provided to ensure that an average 80
13 people will be resettled per annum over the five-year
14 period from 2006 to 2011."

15
16 Then Recommendation 28:

17
18 "With immediate effect, all Commissioners should ensure
19 that they have resourced and implemented arrangements
20 to provide emergency support and accommodation for 11:52
21 persons with a learning disability. Hospitals will not
22 provide this service from 1st January 2008."

23
24 I suppose we can separate them or take them together,
25 whichever you are more comfortable with, but the 11:52
26 question I have in relation to each is the same: were
27 they intended to be indicative for aspirational, or
28 were they intended to be directional? In other words,
29 this has got to be done by these dates and within this

1 timeframe?

2 A. It was a very strong commitment on the part of the
3 Equal Lives Group that that's where they wanted to be
4 and it seemed reasonable. The timeframe slipped for
5 them for the reasons we've already discussed. But if 11:52
6 your place shifted, what they're really saying is over
7 a five-year period, when the clock starts ticking, we
8 should have people out of long-stay learning disability
9 hospitals and that was the kind of numbers that you
10 needed to be moving. The costings were built into that 11:53
11 notion, that these people would have to be relocated.

12 77 Q. But the recommendations were recommendations to central
13 Government to the Trusts, to the people tasked
14 ultimately through a myriad of responsibilities, tasked
15 with the care of people who were long-stay inpatients 11:53
16 in Muckamore and other hospitals. So those are the
17 people you were speaking to, or the Review Group was
18 speaking to.

19
20 Do you know whether anybody came back to say, that is 11:53
21 just not going to be do-able within the timeframe, or
22 give practical reasons why not? Do you know whether
23 there was any feedback along those lines?

24 A. There was a very positive response from within the
25 system as a whole, I felt. We would have picked up 11:54
26 resistance in that first phase. Professor McConkey
27 preferred to be a member of the Ministerial Group,
28 I was Chairing that group with him and he was keeping a
29 very close watch on the implementation side for

1 learning disabilities so I could concentrate on mental
2 health. But he was, I think with me, very positive
3 about how things were going in the first phase.

4 78 Q. Taking Recommendation 20, for example, because it is,
5 the urgency of it is self-evident: 11:54

6
7 "With immediate effect, all Commissioners should ensure
8 they have resourced and implemented arrangements."

9
10 He even talks in terms of emergency support and 11:54
11 accommodation. That's not the sort of recommendation
12 that one puts forward, you know, in the ether. That is
13 a recommendation that is put forward by a group in the
14 expectation that something will be done, would that be
15 fair to say, and done quickly, hence a date? 11:55

16 A. Yes. Yes. It's a model that moves away from hospital
17 provision for people with a learning disability, but
18 recognise that in the limit some individuals at certain
19 points may be in a crisis situation, maybe a mental
20 health need, and you need some form of provision other 11:55
21 than hospital. I think there's discussion to be had
22 around that model, even today, but that was their view
23 and we respected it and supported it.

24 CHAIRMAN: Again, can I just ask: How does this
25 square, these recommendations, how do they square with 11:55
26 the evidence that you gave earlier that you recognise
27 that it wasn't until the last of the reports was in
28 that you were going to make, a sensible bid was going
29 to be able to be made and the Department would be able

1 to look at it as a whole to decide what the funding was
2 going to be?

3
4 Because this talks, for instance, about "80 people will
5 be resettled per annum over a five-year period from 11:56
6 2006", well that's a year before the last report comes
7 in. So how was that actually going to work or am
8 I just misunderstanding?

9 A. 2011, '12 I think it would imply that it would be
10 completed. Five years from 2006. 11:56

11 CHAIRMAN: But was it understood that in fact, at the
12 time these recommendations were made, you were actually
13 going to have to wait until the last report was in
14 before the wheels would start moving?

15 A. Clearly, no. 11:56

16 CHAIRMAN: Okay, that is what I wanted.

17 A. They thought that they could activate that as it is
18 written.

19 CHAIRMAN: well quite, because on the last line of
20 Recommendation 28 is "hospitals will not provide this 11:57
21 service from 1st January 2008." That would have been
22 very aspirational, wouldn't it, given that the last
23 report came in in 2007?

24 A. Yes.

25 79 Q. MR. McEVOY BL: Presumably, and I know the extent to 11:57
26 which maybe you can comment on the thinking behind each
27 of these recommendation, perhaps limited because of
28 your relative authorship or absence of it, but
29 presumably then, notwithstanding what you told the

1 Inquiry earlier on about getting everything together
2 before it went forward, getting all the reports in
3 situ. There must have been an appreciation that,
4 notwithstanding all of that, there were still urgent
5 steps that needed to be taken? 11:57

6 A. Absolutely. I mean, by taking a "let's go through it
7 together" approach, which was the approach the
8 Department adopted, all jump together, and starting in
9 2008, this whole thing, the only phase shifted
10 two years. Considering what was at stake, and the 11:58
11 arguments I have given for the benefits of taking it
12 through together, particularly in relation to
13 infrastructure, I think the model of moving that over a
14 five-year period, if the money had kept coming, was
15 reasonable. 11:58

16 80 Q. I'm not sure if you can help us with this. Just
17 towards the end of paragraph 39, there is just a
18 mention of a system of priority ratings which is part
19 of the Equal Lives Review. It starts, the internal
20 paragraph number is 1250. 11:58

21 A. Oh, yes.

22 81 Q. Can you help us with how those were formulated and how
23 the priorities were assessed, just as a sort of
24 mechanism? If you cannot, we understand?

25 A. I wasn't personally part of the detail of this, but 11:59
26 I can understand what it means, I think. In that,
27 pre-implementation support was a need to gather the
28 relevant forces together to make this happen.
29 Cross-departmental support, for example, would be a

1 particular issue. And then a plan.

2
3 So you weren't wandering aimlessly. You were trying to
4 take something through a very big change. This was
5 quite a big change in the culture. Obviously pump 11:59
6 priming, immediately resourcing to make that happen.
7 Then medium term resourcing was really to see the bulk
8 of the whole process being implemented.

9 82 Q. Just picking up on what we have discussed about the
10 getting together of all of the reports into one final 12:00
11 package so that you could go and put it forward for
12 funding, or those responsible could take it forward for
13 the necessary funding. There's a delineation there at
14 (iii) and (iv) between immediate resourcing from 2006
15 to 12 and then at (iv) for medium term resourcing from 12:00
16 2012 to 2020.

17 A. Yes.

18 83 Q. Immediate resourcing would have been for a period prior
19 to presumably then all of the reports being finalised,
20 is that right? 12:00

21 A. Of course. Because this report is written with the
22 mindset that we can start once we publish this report.
23 Everything is time-locked to that view, 2006 being the
24 start date.

25 84 Q. Is that (iii), is that the pump priming you refer to or 12:01
26 is that something else?

27 A. It's really expecting things to start up once the
28 report has been received. And it's published in 2005,
29 you imagine things will get going into 2006.

1 85 Q. So there should be money on-stream immediately?
2 A. Yes. But of course for the arguments we've heard,
3 we've talked to these things, actually moved back
4 two years. The startup is 2008, 08/09, being the first
5 year of the Action Plan. 12:01

6 86 Q. Okay. So, the next part of your statement deals with
7 the conclusion to the Equal Lives report. I suppose
8 picking up, in particular, paragraph 40. There's the
9 internal, which is at the top of the next page, 17, the
10 internal paragraph 12.58: 12:02

11
12 "The enthusiasm and dedication that has been evident
13 from the many hundreds of people who have participated
14 in the Equal Lives Review demonstrates that there is a
15 strong commitment to improve the quality of lives with 12:02
16 people with a learning disability and their families.
17 The challenge now will be to ensure that the
18 aspirations contained of in this review translated into
19 action across Northern Ireland in a way that ensure
20 that people with a learning disability really can 12:02
21 experience equal lives in the future."

22
23 Paragraph 42 then, just the bottom of the page, you
24 make reference to the May 2000 strategic priorities for
25 the first phase of Review implementation. Going 12:02
26 overleaf:

27
28 "It was envisaged that when the Equal Lives Report was
29 give to the Minister in September 2025, implementation

1 would commence in 2006. The May 2007 document
2 reflected on internal page 105 that there was already
3 delay. "

4
5 You then comment at the very end of that section, 12:03
6 Professor:

7
8 "Sadly, the vision outlined in the Equal Lives Review
9 has not been realised and the detailed roadmap that it
10 devised towards the vision was not followed. The 12:03
11 investment needed to make it a reality was not
12 provided. "

13
14 Setting aside the question of investment, for reasons
15 that you mentioned, austerity may be my word, not 12:03
16 yours, but the years of restriction on the public
17 spending and so on, are there any other factors apart
18 from those extrinsic financial pressures outside
19 Northern Ireland that impeded the progress along that
20 roadmap? 12:04

21 A. I do believe so. I believe one very important factor
22 is that the issue of a work strategy, workforce
23 strategy, needs to be brought into the centre stage as
24 to how that was going to impact on bringing through a
25 lot of the change that was the necessary, particularly 12:04
26 in the health and social care sector.

27
28 We considered it crucial for the success of Bamford
29 that there was a workforce strategy. We also

1 considered it a priority. And that was reflected in
2 the Strategic Priorities Report, which, if you would
3 like, I can refer you to.

4 87 Q. Yes, by all means. Do you have the reference?

5 A. Yes, indeed. If you turn to page 24 and 25. 12:04

6 88 Q. Which year is that report?

7 A. It's the Strategic Priorities Report.

8 89 Q. That's the 2017 one for the first phase?

9 A. Sorry, no, it's the Reform and Modernisation of Mental
10 Health Service in Northern Ireland. It's the Bamford 12:05
11 Review final report that I added to all the reports.
12 We have been using it, we have been referring to it
13 already.

14 90 Q. Its 1500.

15 A. Thank you. 12:05

16 CHAIRMAN: It starts at 1477, doesn't it? Oh, I see.

17 MR. McEVOY BL: Is that the page we were looking at?

18 A. That's correct, thank you.

19 91 Q. That's the one.

20 A. 1500, thank you very much, yes. Can I refer you to 12:06
21 workforce and training just in the lower part of that
22 page. If I can just note with you the following, this
23 is what we state in 2007:

24

25 "The Reform and Modernisation of Mental Health and 12:06
26 Learning Disability Services hinges on a sufficient and
27 competent workforce. The provision of Modern Mental
28 Health and Learning Disability Services can only be
29 achieved if we have a workforce which is able to

1 develop new ways of working which build on best
2 practice and challenge some of the traditional ways of
3 doing things. All areas of the Review anticipate
4 changes in workforce practice, an increase in the
5 numbers of staff, including the imaginative and 12:07
6 creative involvement of support staff, volunteers,
7 users and carers."

8
9 Then just the next sentence:

10
11 "The early establishment of a comprehensive workforce
12 strategy or strategies for both Mental Health and
13 Learning Disability Services is an urgent priority."
14

15 Could I just take you over the page to the next 12:07
16 paragraph?

17 92 Q. Of course.

18 A. Where it says, and here I would like you to think
19 Muckamore Abbey Hospital:

20
21 "At local provider level, the changes and the process
22 of change will present formidable challenges for all
23 staff. These challenges must be adequately prepared
24 for. Robust service organisation, team-working and
25 communication will be pivotal in realising and 12:08
26 maintaining the reforms.

27
28 These must be complemented with a comprehensive
29 workforce strategy embracing recruitment, retention,

1 training, supervision and the participation of users
2 and services. The Review, in consultation with the
3 Department, has prepared a separate workforce
4 framework. "

5 93 Q. I wonder should we look at that now, that Framework? 12:08
6 That is, hopefully, 1596?

7 A. It is 6117 in my document.

8 94 Q. It should be 1596?

9 A. But before we go to it, it is important to note that
10 this was prepared in consultation with the Department, 12:08
11 it wasn't just us throwing something at them out of the
12 blue.

13 95 Q. The Framework?

14 A. This workforce Framework, yes, that we're now turning
15 to. 12:08

16 DR. MAXWELL: I think it starts on 93. If you go back
17 to 93.

18 96 Q. MR. McEVOY BL: The introduction, then, is at 93. Can
19 you tell us, it might be helpful for the Inquiry to
20 know whether it was ever actually developed, what was 12:09
21 done with it?

22 A. To the best of my knowledge there's been no workforce
23 Strategy by the Department to date of any kind.
24 I can't find any. Certainly in my time there was none.

25 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask a supplementary? So 12:09
26 I know that in Northern Ireland there have been a lot
27 of Service Frameworks with associated workforce Plans.

28

29 I know at some point in your evidence there was a

1 discussion about a Service Framework for people with
2 learning disabilities. Has that Framework been
3 completed and would that have a Workforce Strategy
4 associated with it?

5 A. If it were completed it ought to have a workforce 12:10
6 Strategy, but I'm not aware of its existence, but
7 that's my ignorance.

8 DR. MAXWELL: That is maybe something we need to
9 follow-up because there is certainly no other
10 Frameworks here in Northern Ireland that have workforce 12:10
11 Strategies associated with them.

12 MR. McEVOY BL: As far as you are concerned, what is
13 proposed in Annex 8, nothing has been done to activate
14 that meaningfully.

15 A. But in relation to the Inquiry's current concerns, the 12:10
16 absence of a workforce Strategy around those issues
17 I have been mentioning, communication, preparation,
18 change of role. This was a resettlement not just for
19 patients, this was a resettlement for staff. I don't
20 think that was ever realised. 12:10

21 97 Q. Yes. Can you tell us a bit more what you mean by that
22 in practical terms?

23 A. Well I think the Inquiry's own report of 2020 speaks
24 volumes where you have staff anxieties not knowing
25 where the future is and where there's high levels of 12:11
26 sick-leave, absence, and a large amount of agency
27 working which is not the stuff that is conducive to
28 improved quality of patient care.

29

1 I can't say there is a one-for-one relationship because
2 of the absence of a Workforce Strategy, but the
3 Workforce Strategy ought to have had as one of its
4 central concerns the impact of change on existing staff
5 and their roles. This is across the piece, including 12:11
6 mental health. We have massive work to change at
7 changing the way nurses see their roles, as opposed to
8 just caretakers in mental health. Their therapeutic
9 role and their training and skilling. They are the
10 lifeblood of our Health Services, the nursing force. 12:12

11 98 Q. After your discussion in your statement of the Equal
12 Lives Review, you provide a section dealing with
13 subsequent developments. At 44, just following on from
14 what you mentioned about the roadmap not being
15 followed, you say that you do not mean that nothing was 12:12
16 done. Steps were taken, some money was invested, but
17 not enough of either to see the necessary changes
18 brought into being. This is back at page 18, please.
19 Thank you.

20
21 Then you reference the June 2008 consultation 12:12
22 documented delivering the Bamford vision. That begins
23 at page 3100. Sorry, if we can just jump forward to
24 that. Now, within it there's a foreword from the then
25 Minister, Minister Poots. This is page 13, I beg your 12:13
26 pardon, 3101. There's a foreword. Have you got that
27 in front of you, have you got the --

28 A. Yes, I have it in front of me.

29 99 Q. I'm going to ask for it to be brought up on screens.

1 It should be page 3101. The second page in fact,
2 sorry, 3102, I beg your pardon, the Minister says in a
3 paragraph which begins:

4
5 "The Bamford vision set out a 10-15-year timescale for 12:14
6 the enhancement of mental health and well-being, and
7 for learning disability services. A strong foundation
8 has been established and a positive change is evident,
9 but we still have much to do in order to deliver that
10 vision." 12:14

11
12 when he talks about a "strong foundation" as at the
13 date of this report in 2008, was he right to say that?
14 Could he say that with confidence?

15 A. I expect that he's alluding to Government commitment 12:15
16 and the finances have been identified and the Executive
17 has signed up to the whole process and the good work of
18 the Bamford Review has given us the vision and so
19 forth. You need that behind any drive to change. It's
20 not, it's more ethereal than substance, if you know 12:15
21 what I mean? Nothing has happened. There's no actual
22 physical foundation.

23 100 Q. No detail?

24 A. The impetus is in the air.

25 CHAIRMAN: So a positive change is evident. He is 12:15
26 talking about political will as opposed to anything
27 real.

28 A. Yes.

29 MR. McEVOY BL: There's then, you mentioned going back

1 to your statement, paragraph 46, after that
2 consultation exercise, delivering the Bamford vision
3 exercise in October 2009. There's then an Action Plan.
4 Paragraph 50. If you can just move forward to
5 paragraph 50, Section 3.4 of the Action Plan dealt with 12:16
6 "Investment in Services". If I can just read out from
7 the extract that you have included:

8
9 "People with a mental health need or a learning
10 disability benefit from services funded by a range of 12:16
11 Departments, but DHSSPS, DE...".

12
13 which is the Department of Education, is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 101 Q. "...and the Department of Social Development are key 12:16
16 contributors. DHSSPS and DE have specific funding
17 streams devoted to services for these groups of people.
18 Within DHSSPS' area of responsibility, just over £200
19 million was spent in 2007/2008 on Mental Health
20 Services and just under £200 million on Learning 12:17
21 Disability Services. It is estimated that around £200
22 million was spent on services for older people with
23 dementia, and together, accounting for approximately £6
24 million, or almost one-quarter of the Health and Social
25 Care Trust's expenditure. However, too high a 12:17
26 proportion of mental health and learning disability
27 funding is spent on hospital services. The aim is to
28 provide more care in community settings."
29

1 That was clearly something that was, I mean this is a
2 departmental paper as I understand it, it was clearly
3 something that was in their minds. Did they come and
4 say to you, we need more help from you. We need your
5 input in terms of how we go about reducing this in a 12:17
6 proportionate way which is consistent with the vision
7 that you have set out?

8 A. Yes.

9 102 Q. They did?

10 A. Yes. 12:18

11 103 Q. Can you tell us more about that?

12 A. Just repeat your statement?

13 104 Q. I mean there was clearly a cognizance as this Action
14 Plan indicates, there's a concern, I mean the
15 Department is setting it out very clearly, a 12:18
16 recognition that there's a proportion of mental health
17 and learning disability funding spent on hospital
18 services is too high --

19 A. Yes. I just wanted to make sure I got your question.

20 105 Q. To come here and say, you have got to help us with 12:18
21 this. You guys have been looking at this since 2002.
22 Can you help us? Was a message like that or in your
23 terms communicated to you or a request?

24 A. It's one view of the world and it is an important one.
25 It feeds into the more broad-based vision of change and 12:18
26 reform modernisation. But part of that is the view,
27 I agree with the view that the proportion, the amount
28 of resourcing spent at keeping people and supporting
29 people in hospital is out of kilter. And it is a

1 significant part dominated by the people in longer term
2 support in hospitals that ought not to be in hospitals,
3 but could be better managed in community settings.
4

5 That can release money, and the notion is, if you can 12:19
6 release the money you can actually build a community.
7 That is true, but it's only true to a part because the
8 hotel costs in long-stay situations are typically less
9 than most community situations. But secondly, you're
10 not just after hotel costs, you're looking at the 12:19
11 quality of peoples' lives and that's other issues like
12 access to services, access to help, and education, and
13 so forth.

14 106 Q. Did you go, and when I say "you", obviously I'm talking
15 corporately about the Review Team, go back, having 12:20
16 obviously, I presume, looked at the Action Plan,
17 absorbed it, even if the Department didn't come to you
18 before writing that, or after even writing that. Did
19 you say, look, we know what you say here, Section 3.4
20 about the proportion or the too higher proportion of 12:20
21 expenditure in hospital services for people with mental
22 health and learning disability needs, but you have got
23 to understand, you know, people in that situation can't
24 be left high and dry. You've got to make sure that
25 provision is made for them. Do you know whether that 12:20
26 message was translated?

27 A. Are you referring to the people who are still in
28 hospital?

29 107 Q. Yes?

1 A. Yes. No, we didn't. We were geared to the view that
2 people who are in long-stay hospitals, mental
3 hospitals, or learning disability hospitals, should be
4 in their community. So the process was, get them out,
5 find a way, find solutions. It wasn't in our writing 12:21
6 of Bamford, or in our early implementation thinking,
7 what about the people who are left behind? That is why
8 I say I put my hand up as part of this. We might have
9 thought about the process and the impact of the process
10 of change on staff and the process; we certainly had a 12:21
11 work strategy in our mind for staff, but while that was
12 happening perhaps we should have given more thought to
13 the patients in the process change, that two to
14 five years or whatever.

15 108 Q. Because at this point in time in the context of this 12:21
16 Action Plan, you know, the Department is communicating
17 that sentiment very clearly.

18 DR. MAXWELL: Can I just ask a question on this: On
19 page 3018, there is a review of the spending in
20 2010/'11 because there had been a target that 80% of 12:22
21 the LD spend should be on community services, by 2010
22 82% was on. This statement is quite vague "too high a
23 proportion." In your report you were recommending that
24 80% was spent in the community, but by 2010 that target
25 had been exceeded. 12:22

26 MR. McEVOY BL: 3018?

27 DR. MAXWELL: Yes, well according to my notes if I have
28 measured it properly.

29 CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 5.7.4, I think, at the bottom of

1 the page.

2 DR. MAXWELL: Yes. So was the problem the proportion
3 or the total quantum of money available for LD?

4 A. In relation to what?

5 109 Q. DR. MAXWELL: well, if there wasn't enough community 12:23
6 provision, was it actually because too much was being
7 spent in the hospital, or was it that the total amount
8 on LD in total wasn't enough?

9 A. I think the latter is the dominant factor here, but
10 we're just getting going by 2011. It's in the right 12:23
11 direction.

12 110 Q. DR. MAXWELL: So the proportions might be right but the
13 total amount of money meant that neither the Hospital
14 nor the community had enough.

15 A. Yes. 12:23

16 111 Q. DR. MAXWELL: But it wasn't the division between them
17 that was wrong?

18 A. No. I think more money would have tipped the whole
19 thing in the other direction. I think there is the
20 myth around that if you just move people to the 12:23
21 community, you release their money and that will do it.
22 And apart from bridging finance methods, which is
23 extremely important to get you through that, you still
24 find when you're looking after people with complex
25 needs in the community, it is an expensive model. And 12:24
26 that's what we were building our funding basis or
27 bidding basis, our financial costs on, the assumption
28 that this is more expensive than a hospital-based
29 warehousing kind of model.

1 CHAIRMAN: Do you factor, it's a terribly complicated
2 calculation, I imagine, because if you just look at it
3 in one year it will be undoubtedly far more expensive
4 I imagine. But the long-term saving of closing an
5 entire hospital and selling the estate, does that get
6 factored in or not? 12:24

7 A. I know people back at Treasury are considerably
8 exercised by the possibilities of the estate value. I
9 think Roy McConkey gave good examples.

10 CHAIRMAN: He mentioned it, yes. 12:24

11 A. And his experience in Scotland where that was used by,
12 which Trust?

13 CHAIRMAN: I can't remember either, but I remember his
14 example.

15 A. They had a big spend as a result from it. But I think 12:25
16 the situation in relation to Muckamore wouldn't have
17 necessarily been a big money source given its rule.

18 CHAIRMAN: Also, I suppose somehow you have to factor
19 in the potential long-term benefit to the patients who
20 may be getting better care. 12:25

21 A. To me that was the only issue. It is not about whether
22 it costs more or less, it is about what's right. There
23 will be a release of money eventually. The estimate
24 was, I think, it was £20,000 per patient per bed in
25 Muckamore. So, you know, when we talked about £80,000 12:25
26 per year for a community placement, it wasn't nothing
27 in hospital, it is quite expensive. So you do release
28 money.

29 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask you, obviously some of these

1 problems have been experienced by the rest of the UK,
2 so closure of major hospitals in England, for example,
3 took place in the '80s. Did you seek out information
4 from England about some of these problems?

12:26

5
6 Because for me, some of what you are talking about is
7 very, very familiar. So, for example, being left with
8 a lot of very challenging people as you start
9 resettlement, that was extremely common. I think it
10 probably happened everywhere a big hospital was closed.
11 Likewise, some of the costing issues have been very
12 well thought through over there, simply because they
13 were doing it 20, 30 years earlier.

12:26

14 A. I'm not aware because I wasn't involved in the
15 financial resourcing or management of any of this.
16 We certainly consulted on models of care widely and
17 sought insight from colleagues. For example, I had my
18 opposite number in relation to the Service Framework
19 for Mental Health who I met up with. We were also
20 encouraging and did visit other centres outside of the
21 UK. I think Roy McConkey mentioned Sweden. I visited
22 Sweden to look at their community care model for mental
23 health. But at that stage we weren't looking at the
24 cost aspect of the model, but we were fairly sure it
25 was going to cost us more, inevitably. I have to say
26 the learning disability problem has not gone away in
27 England either, I mean it is still there, there are
28 still resettlement issues.

12:27

12:27

12:27

29 DR. MAXWELL: Yes, but its much, much, much smaller

1 than here per head.

2 A. Today ours is quite...

3 MR. McEVOY BL: While we're on the Action Plan, are you
4 okay to continue? Could you use a comfort break,
5 please say.

12:28

6 A. No, that's all right. I'm doing fine. Thank you.

7 112 Q. If we could move down. It is the same exhibit or it
8 should be, 3124, there's a paragraph 6.6, Professor,
9 "Resettlement":

10

12:29

11 "There are currently around 200 long-stay patients in
12 learning disability hospitals who no longer require
13 hospital treatment and who could be resettled into the
14 community. As with mental health, work will continue
15 over the period of this Action Plan to seek alternative
16 care arrangements for as many of these people as
17 possible with the current funding of...".

18 And this is the figure I think you mentioned this
19 morning of 6.4 million:

20

12:29

21 "...identified for this and to identify options to
22 achieve the long-term objective to complete the
23 resettlement programme by 2015. The principle of
24 betterment will continue to inform decisions."

25

12:29

26 Can you tell the Inquiry what you understand by the
27 "principle of betterment"?

28 A. I understand that is about quality of life and what the
29 needs are of people to have Equal Lives, what underpins

1 that concept of an equal life and improvement in their
2 life situation compared with being in a hospital
3 situation.

4 113 Q. So, in other words, if they are leaving the Hospital to
5 go into the community, things should be getting better 12:30
6 for them, life should be getting, their quality of life
7 should be getting better?

8 A. Yes, it's not just a matter of putting patients, as it
9 were, in a box somewhere else.

10 114 Q. Yes, moving the problem out of the hospital to 12:30
11 somewhere else?

12 A. Moving the problem. It is what does equal life mean?
13 what does that cost per year, per person, that person.
14 And if that cost £120,000 per year for that person to
15 give him something like, or she, something like you and 12:30
16 I have, then that's betterment, that's what it's for.

17 115 Q. In your view, and with the benefit of your experience,
18 did the principle of betterment continue to inform
19 decisions after this Action Plan?

20 A. Well I think there was resettlement continuing, so they 12:31
21 obviously did achieve that. I refer to the Northern
22 Ireland Housing Executive Report which makes quite good
23 reading. It does seem to suggest that quite a lot of
24 relocation in domestic kind of situations was being
25 achieved. 12:31

26
27 And my discussion with Joe McGuinness, who is a
28 consultant, had been a Clinical Director in Learning
29 Disability Services in the Southern Trust, described

1 the kind of changes and the kind of improvement that
2 were achieved in subsequent years. So I think a lot
3 has been done, but we are still down to a core of
4 people that have not yet been relocated.

5 DR. MAXWELL: Do you have any idea what the challenges
6 around resettling that core who are left are? 12:31

7 A. Yes, I have thought about this. It seems that the
8 Trust's approach to much of the resettlement programme
9 is depending on the private sector and its a private
10 sector solution they're finding all the time. If the 12:32
11 private sector can't come up, they're stuck.

12
13 So I think there is a problem in either getting the
14 private sector to come forward or else for the
15 Department to step up and say, look, we need across the 12:32
16 Departments to be finding a solution here to our
17 learning disability community, not to hang behind a
18 devolved problem to Trusts who have not got the
19 resources to provide a domestic model themselves.

20 DR. MAXWELL: And cannot purchase it. 12:33

21 A. They can't purchase it.

22 DR. MAXWELL: Could I ask about this core set of people
23 that you're describing. Are you referring to everybody
24 in Muckamore when you talk about that? Because we are
25 aware that there were assessment and treatment beds and 12:33
26 you say at the beginning of your report that you
27 expected that Muckamore patients would be resettled
28 into the community, apart from a small assessment and
29 treatment unit.

1 A. Yes.

2 116 Q. But certainly in the RQIA 2016 report there were 87
3 people described as being in the assessment and
4 treatment beds. Now, that doesn't sound to me like
5 it's small and it sounded to me like; were these the 12:33
6 new long-stay Muckamore patients? So could you clarify
7 when you are talking about the core that needs to be
8 resettled, are you just referring to the resettlement
9 beds there, or are you referring also to the assessment
10 and treatment beds? 12:34

11 A. Well, insofar as the situation that you described
12 pertains regarding assessment and treatment, the
13 numbers, I agree with you, sound large. I think if you
14 come back to the ideals of the Equal Lives group, much
15 of the assessment and treatment ought to be provided 12:34
16 within a community setting.

17 DR. MAXWELL: Absolutely.

18 A. Small units are quite capable of doing this.

19 DR. MAXWELL: Absolutely.

20 A. But there are perhaps; I think this is a matter of 12:34
21 debate and I think it is not local, it's an
22 international issue. Do you need sometimes some beds
23 in a hospital, healthcare staffed situation or not, or
24 can you do it in a community facility that basically
25 has the skills to do whatever needs to be done to help 12:35
26 individuals to get through their crisis, treat their
27 mental illness.

28

29 We do know, for example, in South Stockholm, they have

1 done that for mental illness. I've seen that.
2 we haven't achieved that and the model that we have
3 bought into, and it is fairly universal around the UK,
4 it is about 40 beds per 100,000 for mental health, and
5 it seems to work. If you go to a different model, 12:35
6 I think you probably need a much greater invested
7 system than we have with small community homes.

8 DR. MAXWELL: Yes, but the crucial question is: How
9 many assessment and treatment beds would you need for
10 learning disabilities per-hundred-thousand? And the 12:35
11 number, if it's anything like 87, as it was in 2016,
12 that is a very large number compared to other areas I
13 have worked in.

14 A. Yes, absolutely, I would agree with you. My
15 understanding, for example, in the Southern Trust, it's 12:36
16 a 10-bed assessment unit. That was achieved,
17 serendipity is often very important, it is part of the
18 Southern Board's strategy during this difficult period,
19 there was a plan for mental health to have a second
20 Alcoholism Unit there and they decided not to go ahead 12:36
21 with it.

22
23 Again the Clinical Director, Joe McGuinness took the
24 initiative and asked the Department if he could have
25 the assessment unit beds, beds for an assessment unit, 12:36
26 she will commit to relocating the long-stay patients,
27 getting the extra resources released by that mechanism.
28 And they use I think a 10-bed assessment unit for a
29 population of 250,000.

1 DR. MAXWELL: Yes, that's more the sort of size I would
2 expect.

3 A. So you're talking probably about a 30-bed assessment
4 unit.

5 DR. MAXWELL: At the very most, I would say. 12:37

6 A. Muckamore is covering three-fifths of the Province at
7 the minute. It cover three Trust areas, northern
8 Trust, Southeastern and the Eastern. It also, I think
9 has still got a forensic component to it for the
10 region. So it had always been seen as a sort of 12:37
11 Regional Unit for difficult issues tend to move
12 towards. That needs to be factored in, but I'm not an
13 expert on the details, but I agree with your direction
14 of travel here.

15 DR. MAXWELL: I suppose the real question is: Were the 12:37
16 community services improving sufficiently? Did they
17 have sufficient multi-disciplinary intensive support
18 teams to support people out in the community to stop
19 them having to go in to assessment and treatment beds
20 and create a new long-stay population? That's the 12:37
21 crucial question I think.

22 A. It is, and from my impression on the ground, that is
23 what they are trying to do. Patients are no longer
24 admitted, insofar as possible, that they are managed in
25 the community. So there's a very strong commitment to 12:38
26 that end of the problem. I do think it probably needs
27 more investment these days, just given the history of
28 the problem that we've looked at and it hasn't got
29 better.

1 There's a new Mental Health Strategy, by the way, and
2 I think this Committee ought to take note of it because
3 there is scant mention of the mental health needs of
4 people with a learning disability. That is a 21 to 31
5 strategy, ten-year strategy. It would deal with those 12:38
6 kinds of issues. It ought to be prioritised.

7
8 There are specialist areas in mental health and there's
9 a mental health of learning disability. I don't think
10 we should throw the baby out with the bath water here. 12:38
11 There is a core need, mental health need, and it needs
12 specialist skills and specialist staff wherever they
13 are based.

14 MR. McEVOY BL: Professor, at paragraph 55 of your
15 statement then you make reference to the November 2012 12:39
16 Mental Health Action Plan published by DHSSPS. This is
17 the Action Plan for 2012/2015. You quote from it then
18 quite extensively in the following paragraphs.

19
20 A query arises in relation to internal, the paragraph 12:39
21 is 57, the statement paragraph is 57 and then it is the
22 internal paragraph 1.9 within that. So it should be
23 page 24. So reference is made there to:

24
25 "Transforming Your Care (TYC) 12:40
26

27 A Review of Health and Social Care in Northern Ireland
28 which was published in December 2011 has many parallels
29 with the Bamford vision in respect of mental health and

1 learning disability provision and enhancements."

2

3

4

5

6

Then it goes on to list a series of items. Can I ask whether you can tell us about the crossover, the extent of the crossover between transforming your care and Bamford? 12:40

7

A. That's a good question. I am not competent to answer. Because at this stage I am disengaged focusing on legislation at this point. But it did seem that there was an attempt to measure the ideals between the two processes. 12:40

10

11

12

117 Q. Do you know then, maybe you are not competent to answer the follow-up, but do you know whether there has been any evaluation of "TYC" on people with learning disabilities? 12:41

13

14

15

16

A. I don't know is the answer.

17

118 Q. Okay, and you don't know presumably then about the status of TYC currently in guiding the Trust's planning of services for people with learning disability?

18

19

20

A. Your statement is correct, yes. 12:41

21

119 Q. Now, paragraph 59 then. This is, I think, looking at the same Action Plan. Your introductory sentence at paragraph 59 is:

22

23

24

25

"It is of significance importance to understanding the key problem, is what is set out at paragraph 3.13." 12:41

26

27

28

That is of the Action Plan and then you quote from it:

29

1 "Funding will continue to be a significant challenge in
2 the period 2015 and beyond. There is continuing
3 pressure to achieve efficiencies. The only additional
4 funding to the health and social care sector earmarked
5 for mental health and learning disabilities services
6 over the budget period 2011 to 2015 is £9.2 million."
7

8 CHAIRMAN: You need to slow down a bit.

9 MR. McEVOY BL: Sorry:

10
11 "The only additional funding to the health and social
12 care sector earmarked for mental health and learning
13 disability services over the budget period 2011 to 2015
14 is £9.2 million, £2.8 million for mental health, and
15 £6.4 million for learning disability, to continue the 12:42
16 resettlement programme."
17

18 what is the key problem, just in a sentence? what is
19 the key problem?

20 A. Public sector funding crisis. 12:42

21 120 Q. Now, we mentioned the figure of £6.4 million a number
22 of times this morning.

23 A. Yes, indeed.

24 121 Q. So we're absolutely clear, what would have been
25 required, what kind of figure would have been required 12:42
26 to resettle all the patients?

27 A. I think the figures are already in the details that
28 we've given.

29 122 Q. Is that the 173?

1 A. Yes.

2 123 Q. That's the gap, that's the £173 million that we looked
3 at this morning?

4 A. The proportion of that.

5 124 Q. The proportion of that relative? 12:43

6 A. Spread across the cycles of action plans should achieve
7 that. And the achievement got during the first phase
8 is a measure of what can be done if you have got the
9 money. So it is a big factor in making things happen.

10 125 Q. At paragraph 60 then you say that: 12:43

11

12 "The only additional funding that was to be made
13 available for learning disability in the 2012 to 2015
14 period was £6.4 million. The contrast with the 2009 to
15 2011 Action Plan, which itself did not provide the 12:43
16 amount of funding, that we had identified as necessary,
17 will hopefully be obvious."

18

19 So there's a pattern, or certainly a trend of
20 insufficient funding getting smaller, were you alerting 12:44
21 the Department to this and to the impact it was likely
22 to have?

23 A. I think I'm out of the system at this point because
24 this is 2012. I'm no longer on the Ministerial Group.
25 It had been stood down. I think it lasted 12:44
26 two-and-a-half years to get the first phase up and
27 running.

28

29 So I was aware of this and I was in conversation with

1 them at this time and I was on the mental health side,
2 where it was even more disastrous. We were looking at
3 things we could do in relation to cultural change that
4 wouldn't cost money and that's where the Recovery
5 Colleges Initiative started from which I think has been 12:44
6 extremely successful, but I mean they were strapped.

7 126 Q. I appreciate there is a public sector funding crisis,
8 but I mean having been so close to the work of the
9 Equal Lives Review, given your Chairmanship of the
10 Bamford work, did you feel that it was within your gift 12:45
11 or your compass to go back to, or to go to the
12 Department and say, you know, we did years of work
13 here, lots of it, and it is at risk if this funding
14 continues in this trajectory?

15 A. I think our collective disappointment was palpable, you 12:45
16 know. I think the Department was very disappointed in
17 what it had been landed with. My main frustration when
18 I left the Review was the absence of a workforce
19 Strategy because, you know, you can do a lot without a
20 lot of money if you have a Workforce Learning Programme 12:46
21 going.

22 127 Q. Would work on the workforce Strategy, and I don't want
23 to overstate this and if I am wrong you will correct
24 me, but would it have at least helped to mitigate some
25 of the effects of the public sector spending squeeze? 12:46

26 A. If it had been up and running when we said it was
27 immediately required it would have got a lot of the
28 skill base up and a lot of the cultural change within
29 staffing set. It would have run into a funding crisis

1 as well, but I think in proportion to the budget, a
2 much smaller budget. That's why I say the Recovery
3 College, which is really a cultural change, you can do
4 a lot with a few staff and training.

5 CHAIRMAN: I mean the cultural change, does that come
6 about by training or issuing protocols, or how does it
7 actually manifest itself? 12:46

8 A. I think you need; there are several strands to this.
9 It deserves more time than me speaking off the top of
10 my head. But, you know, it's leadership. You know, 12:47
11 it's about leading from the front. It's about showing
12 staff how things are done by giving them the training,
13 by giving them the supervision and helping to feel
14 supported and not isolated.

15
16 It can transform people if you hang-in with them and
17 you recognise people in a long-stay caring situation
18 that, you know, you are important, you're not
19 forgotten. And people like me, who are in a leadership
20 role, our visibility in that made a difference and 12:47
21 I think they needed champions like that to be in the
22 system.

23 CHAIRMAN: It doesn't necessarily need to be expensive
24 to do that.

25 A. That's exactly right. You need a few people, trainers 12:47
26 and supervisors and you can cascade a lot of this stuff
27 as well, you can now use remote learning, of course,
28 you don't have to get people into a hospital seminar
29 room to do this. So it is relatively easy.

1 MR. McEVOY BL: Moving forward slightly in time
2 to November 2013. This is paragraph 62 then of your
3 statement. There is a publication then by the
4 Department of DHSSPS of a 33-page monitoring report
5 which is:

12:48

6
7 "Delivering the Bamford vision. The response of the
8 Northern Ireland Executive to the Bamford Review of
9 Mental Health and Learning Disability Action Plan, 2012
10 to 2015."

12:49

11
12 You have included that within the exhibits.

13
14 without going into the fine detail of that report, just
15 so the Inquiry understands what the status of that
16 monitoring report was, I appreciate, I think you
17 stepped out at this stage, have you, at November '13?

12:49

18 A. Yes. I'm out of it as such, but I'm aware of the
19 report.

20 128 Q. It is because you have included it, that is why I was
21 going to ask you. What was the implication then of the
22 monitoring report for the earlier action report? Did
23 that mean it was relegated or what was the impact of it
24 on the earlier plan?

12:49

25 A. Well, it obviously recognised what had been achieved to
26 date and then it set out an Action Plan for what was
27 possible with the limited resources. As you know,
28 following this, they set up a series of factors to
29 monitor red, orange, green.

12:49

1 129 Q. You discussed that then, the sort of traffic light
2 system which measures benchmarks?

3 A. Yes, their shopping list of what they could do was
4 obviously very limited, but they are making the best of
5 what it is to sell it back to us, you know, this is 12:50
6 what we've achieved. But there's only so much they can
7 do now.

8 130 Q. What did you feel about that, having seen the
9 comparative lack of progress?

10 A. Oh, well, I mean it's sad. It's so sad. They seem to 12:50
11 have run out of steam writing these reports. It must
12 have been very difficult.

13 131 Q. There is then a section in your statement where you
14 talk about your involvement with the Mental Capacity
15 Act and you've touched on it already. At paragraph 71 12:50
16 then, you tell us that you did continue to be involved
17 with Departmental work arising from the Bamford Review:
18

19 "Latterly this related to work to bring forward the
20 Mental Capacity Act which was the outworking of our 12:51
21 2017 report."
22

23 I am trying to slow down as much as possible now:
24

25 "A comprehensive legislative framework that was 12:51
26 referred to earlier in the statement."
27

28 Then you describe your involvement in summary form, but
29 you have included then in the exhibits a lecture that

1 you provided at Edinburgh Napier University. I think
2 it is possibly the concept that you touched on this
3 morning, which was that of, now you'll remind me,
4 substitution?

5 A. Substitute decision-making. 12:51

6 132 Q. Substitute decision-making. I think it is discussed,
7 in fact, it is possibly the very last page. It should
8 be 3341. I'm just going to give you an opportunity to
9 tell us a bit more about it given that you have
10 mentioned it at the outset. It may be the very last 12:52
11 page of the entire production. It's possibly in fact
12 3341. It is actually the penultimate page. There you
13 are, accurate as ever. "UNCRPD Compliance". Is that
14 not a heading, Professor?

15 A. Yes, that's it there. 12:52

16 133 Q. And it may be that you want to tell us a bit more about
17 that for the Inquiry's understanding and given what Mr.
18 Ruck Keene had to tell the Inquiry last week about the
19 UNCRPD, and then Professor McConkey, in terms of how
20 all of this fell into the eventual passing of the 12:52
21 Mental Capacity Act?

22 A. Alex Ruck Keene, we collaborate closely actually and he
23 is helping us at the moment to look at the under 16s
24 legislation. But he had flagged the problem of the new
25 thinking coming through with UNCRPD and mentions, quite 12:53
26 rightly, that we made little mention in the Bamford
27 Review legislative document about UNCRPD. We mention
28 it once. It is mentioned in the other reports.
29

1 UNCRPD came in in 2006. It was really quite near the
2 end of Bamford and it wasn't actually adopted by
3 England or UK, I should say, until 2009. But of
4 particular relevance, it wasn't until 2014, which is
5 relative recently, that the general, the Committee of 12:53
6 the UNCRPD gave an interpretation of UNCRPD, which not
7 everybody agrees with at all. It is really what I'm
8 quoting here as saying:

9
10 "Compliance with Article 12 requires that State parties 12:54
11 abolish all substitute decision-making regimes."
12

13 Now, that happened to us while our Bill was at a very
14 advanced stage in the Assembly. It was just ready for
15 consultation. So while this applied to all of the 12:54
16 jurisdictions, and obviously much further afield, we
17 were particularly vulnerable. The whole Bill could
18 disappear. Help for us came from several quarters, one
19 particular one was the Essex Autonomy Project. It set
20 itself up to look at whether or not the English 12:54
21 Capacity Act was compatible to the UNCRPD.
22

23 There was a number of recommendations: One was, of
24 course, that the Mental Capacity Act England and Wales
25 2005 did not fully comply. But the second thing is, 12:55
26 they did not think that the interpretation of the
27 UNCRPD by the Committee was correct and we relied quite
28 heavily on that.
29

1 The second thing is, the Essex Project reported again
2 on the different jurisdictions and they referred to the
3 Northern Ireland Act. It's in the report. I haven't
4 got it in front of me, but as I recall it, they
5 describe our Act as innovative. There was some very 12:55
6 creative writing and drafting done by our legal team.
7 And the two main factors that they did was to decouple
8 diagnostic disease from impairment and lack of
9 capacity. And, secondly, was the special regard as the
10 Essex Autonomy Project referred to, that is special 12:56
11 regard for a person's will and preferences.
12

13 So our Act goes really far to put the requirement to
14 have a person's wishes in the decision frame. So it
15 felt that we would be as near compliant as you could be 12:56
16 and had benefited from the rest of the UK.

17 CHAIRMAN: This is my ignorance entirely, and I am sure
18 my panelists know the answer to this, but I do not
19 quite understand how you can abolish all substitute
20 decision-making regime if you have somebody in a severe 12:56
21 mental health crisis, for instance. What does it
22 actually mean in these circumstances?

23 A. On a personal level, I think it's a nonsense.

24 CHAIRMAN: It is not such a stupid question then as
25 I thought it was. 12:57

26 A. I think it is a nonsense. As I said, I think quite
27 early on in my presentation, you must think of the
28 Capacity Act that we have as a fusion act. The
29 arguments in favour of supporting the Act stands

1 whether it was just a pure Capacity Act, but we're not
2 a pure Capacity Act, we're a combined Mental Health Act
3 with a mental capacity provision, typical provision.
4

5 As I said earlier, there is no country that I know of 12:57
6 that doesn't have a Mental Health Act running
7 alongside. Ours is fused. I think, as you're
8 intimating, there's no situation where a Mental Health
9 Act could operate without substitute decision-making.
10 We're talking about people who are psychotic. I mean, 12:57
11 you just need a few examples, there may be overuse of
12 the provisions, but in the extreme, in the limit you
13 have a person who has no insight and he wants to jump
14 off a bridge because he feels the angels have dammed
15 him to hell or some such delusional thinking. 12:58

16 CHAIRMAN: I think we've got the point.

17 A. Typically harm to self, but there is also harm to
18 others.

19 134 Q. MR. McEVOY BL: Essentially what you are advocating for
20 and what the passage of the Act really produced was, 12:58
21 and why it has been described as "ground-breaking" is,
22 we are moving away from a model where substitute
23 decision-making is the default for all circumstances.
24 We are moving towards a situation were optimally and
25 where it is possible, there should be supported 12:58
26 decision-making but there may be circumstances in which
27 there is no alternative but for substitute
28 decision-making. Is that a fair summation?

29 A. That's absolutely the case and our aim was to put the

1 criteria around which you would interfere with a
2 person's decision-making, and that should be impaired
3 decision-making capacity.

4 135 Q. That is what's novel essentially about the Act?

5 A. What we have done is tackled substitute decision-making 12:59
6 head-on and say, look, you do need it, but on the right
7 ethical footing. This is anti-discrimination. This
8 brings the mental health isolated community on a
9 separate Act out of a discriminated single Act
10 situation, and brings them into the same situation for 12:59
11 all health and all welfare. In the limit there is a
12 situation where you will need substitute
13 decision-making.

14
15 I should say that view is not just mine. The Law 12:59
16 Society of England and Wales commenting in 2017 said,
17 the direction that Northern Ireland has travelled
18 should be something that the English Act Review should
19 take into consideration. Well they have, but they
20 haven't moved. Lady Hale, writing in the bulletin last 13:00
21 year, I can give you the reference, said, once again,
22 I agree that the direction should be impaired
23 decision-making capacity, and while I am trying to
24 influence the Review Team for the English Mental Health
25 Act Review, I think they're waiting on Northern Ireland 13:00
26 to see what their experience is. So we are very much
27 in a social experiment here, once the Department
28 actually gets around to implementing it in full.

29 136 Q. Perhaps not for the first time, Professor.

1 CHAIRMAN: How are you doing for time? I am very happy
2 to sit on if we can finish in the next 10 minutes.
3 MR. McEVOY BL: I am in your hands now, but I am really
4 very close now to drawing matters to a conclusion.
5 CHAIRMAN: Absolutely, and you would prefer us to 13:01
6 finish, wouldn't you?
7 A. I would prefer to see it through now, if you wouldn't
8 mind.
9 CHAIRMAN: I understand. Okay. Well if everybody can
10 bear with us. 13:01
11 MR. McEVOY BL: Hopefully 10 minutes will suffice.
12
13 Really it is, Professor, just with a view now to coming
14 to some of the matters that you raise in the conclusion
15 of your statement, which begins at paragraph 75. Let 13:01
16 me give you the full opportunity now to talk about what
17 you have set out. At 75 you say:
18
19 "It is, of course, possible to consider abuse and poor
20 practice at Muckamore Abbey Hospital as a local 13:01
21 problem, for which individuals and/or a single health
22 Trust could be blamed. However, it seems to me that if
23 this is the approach taken by the Inquiry then there is
24 a danger that the real whole system problems will not
25 be identified, owned and addressed, and that any 13:02
26 findings and recommendations the Inquiry might make are
27 unlikely to reduce, to the greatest extent possible,
28 the risk of repetition."
29

1 So do you harbour a lingering concern that there may be
2 a risk of an unduly sort of local focus, Professor,
3 just on how the issues in the Terms of Reference are
4 being approached?

5 A. Well, I think the long journey you've taken me on today 13:02
6 gives me a lot of reassurance that the concerns I have
7 for what I describe in this as "an unfortunate
8 coalescence of factors" has been well exposed and
9 talked about this morning.

10 13:03
11 I would just want to add one other factor that might
12 well be worth considering, and that is the unfortunate
13 coincidental timing of the Review of public
14 administration and its implementation.

15 137 Q. The inquiry Panel may not be familiar with what that 13:03
16 entailed. If you could summarise it in as brief a way
17 as you feel you can do it justice and what the
18 implications of it were, just for how things ran and
19 now run in Northern Ireland?

20 A. This is quite a large piece of work carried out in 13:03
21 2005/06, again, under direct rule and Peter Hain was
22 the Direct Rule Minister. There was a radical
23 re-organisation, rationalisation, of a lot of our
24 public sector services, health, housing, education,
25 particularly the health sector. And it was to try and 13:03
26 take out some of the layers of bureaucracy.

27 CHAIRMAN: It was the burning of the quangos or
28 whatever it was called, yes.

29 A. That's it. And the significance of it is in relation

1 to Muckamore Abbey, before the review of public
2 administration, I know for a fact that the hospital had
3 cultivated a very good working relationship with its
4 community trust, which was North and West
5 Belfast Trust. Roy McConkey referred to it in his 13:04
6 presentation last week.

7
8 They had arranged and succeeded in the Board's holding
9 its meetings, its Board meeting at the Trust. So it
10 was that kind of intimacy they were trying to 13:04
11 cultivate. I knew the Chief Executive extremely well,
12 Richard Black. He had a keen interest in community
13 matters in mental health and learning disability. All
14 that disappeared in 2007, April 2007. And you had a
15 new Trust right at the very moment, a massive Trust, 13:04
16 one of the largest in the UK in a situation where
17 Bamford was just going live and where there was really
18 no relationship between the Hospital, sitting 15 miles
19 away, and this large Hospital Trust, with its major
20 concerns about the two great hospitals, The Royal 13:05
21 Hospital, The Royal Victoria and The Belfast City
22 Hospital. I have lived through the 40-years of being
23 in these Trusts and I know that the tension between
24 those two Trusts about merger was in the frame for
25 years. So when this happened, this was merger. So it 13:05
26 was a big issue for the new Trust.

27
28 And, secondly, the regional services, cancer services,
29 trauma services, all focusing on this new Trust.

1 I think, and my experience is that mental health and
2 learning disability were down their priority list in
3 those early years, understandably. So it was
4 unfortunate. So I think it is a contextual matter that
5 I think is worth being aware of. 13:06

6 138 Q. You then say at 76 and 77, let's take 76 first:

7
8 "I do not seek to in any way excuse or justify the
9 abuse of patients by staff at Muckamore Abbey Hospital,
10 nor do I seek to condone poor practices that occurred 13:06
11 there. I also do not seek to absolve the Belfast Trust
12 in respect of any management or other deficiencies it
13 will be shown to have had in its running of Muckamore
14 Abbey Hospital.

15 13:06
16 However, it must also be important for the Inquiry to
17 reflect on a desperately regrettable perfect storm of
18 factors may have contributed at Muckamore Abbey
19 Hospital. This must include the fact that a single
20 health Trust, albeit one of significant size and 13:06
21 standing, was left to run a regional facility,
22 including a facility with forensic responsibility,
23 whilst at the same time trying to empty it of its
24 patients, but without the whole system resources (not
25 limited to funding) envisioned by the Bamford Review 13:07
26 and agreed to by government."

27
28 So the perfect storm of factors that you have described
29 referenced and, indeed, you discussed throughout the

1 course of the morning is not something, so that the
2 Inquiry is clear, is not something that in any way
3 should be taken to downplay or dilute any of the things
4 that the Inquiry is looking at, the events or incidents
5 that the Inquiry is looking at?

13:07

6 A. Absolutely. Absolutely.

7 139 Q. The Belfast Trust which has responsibility overall for
8 Muckamore is a single Health Trust but it is not simply
9 one of a number of, just one of a number in Northern
10 Ireland, it is sort of a first-among-equals, if you
11 like, would that be fair to say?

13:08

12 A. Because of regional services particularly.

13 140 Q. In addition to Muckamore, it also runs, for example,
14 The Royal Victoria Hospital, one of those world
15 renowned centres of excellence, so on and so forth.
16 You would presumably want to correct any impression
17 that may be picked up from what you have said there
18 that the Trust saddled with this responsibility, the
19 Belfast Trust was no Ordinary Trust, wouldn't that be
20 fair to say?

13:08

13:08

21
22 Do you know whether your colleagues went at any time,
23 or whether colleagues within the Trust went at any time
24 to the Department with respect to Muckamore and said,
25 look, this is getting too much or we cannot handle this
26 or we need assistance. Now, I am putting it very
27 crudely there, you will appreciate, but was the message
28 ever transmitted that this is becoming a real issue for
29 us and we are not sure if we are going to be able to

13:09

1 handle it?

2 CHAIRMAN: When you say "this," what are you referring
3 to?

4 MR. McEVOY BL: Well I am just about to explain that to
5 the witness. 13:09

6

7 So, what I am saying is, in terms of the decision that
8 was taken to resettle and, as you put it, empty the
9 hospital of its patients with all of the associated
10 issues, do you know where there concerns about the 13:09
11 Belfast Trust's ability to see that through was ever
12 communicated?

13 A. No, I don't think that was ever in the air. I think
14 the issues that were in the air was the funding
15 failures and I have pointed to other issues which 13:10
16 I think were operating. But I don't think people were
17 articulating them particularly.

18 141 Q. Do you think it may have helped if they had articulated
19 them?

20 A. Certainly. If they were experiencing difficulties, 13:10
21 yes, absolutely. The ability of the system to respond
22 in the absence of a work strategy, a Workforce Strategy
23 is an issue.

24 DR. MAXWELL: Can I ask you a question about that? So
25 you talked about the importance in delivering Bamford 13:10
26 in preparing staff for a change in the way care is
27 delivered. We know from the Workforce Report that 70%
28 of the staff were nurses.

29

1 To what extent was the Director of Nursing at Belfast
2 Trust, or the Chief Nursing Officer in Northern Ireland
3 involved in any way in preparing for this change, or to
4 what extent were they involved in the Bamford Review?

5 A. The silos of professionalism weren't really a major 13:11
6 issue. We would have had nurses and doctors, but
7 we didn't actually bring them, we didn't work through
8 like the Chief Medical Officer or the Chief Nursing
9 Officer as such.

10 DR. MAXWELL: But the Workforce Review says 70% of the 13:11
11 workforce are nursing, and yet, I can't see how there
12 was a response from Nursing to this and they are 70% of
13 the workforce, according to the Workforce Review.

14 A. I agree, but we hadn't the Workforce Review. What 13:11
15 we have laid out is what should have been happening.
16 I made several attempts to try and encourage the
17 Department to set-up a Workforce Review. I think in
18 the Priorities Report there is reference to documents
19 on ways of working which includes nursing reports.

20 13:11
21 We were aware of the insights coming in from Nursing
22 and, certainly, the Department would have to be across
23 professions, but also wider than the provisions, the
24 user community and the carer community in a Workforce
25 Strategy. You need a very multi-disciplinary group. 13:12
26 It would be easy enough to design a process that would
27 get a good Workforce Strategy going if they just took
28 the initiative.

29 142 Q. MR. McEVOY BL: Just on that very score and following

1 on from Dr. Maxwell's question, what do you think it
2 might have looked like? I mean, if it was quite simple
3 in terms of getting the views and the input of nurses
4 who are, as you put it earlier on, the lifeblood of the
5 hospital there?

13:12

6 A. Well, you would need some sort of an overall programme
7 team and that programme team would have to have input
8 from the professional groups. You would have to have a
9 representative from the Department CNO, DNO, or ask
10 their guidance, or work through RCN. I mean, there are
11 accepted routes for getting representation.

13:13

12 143 Q. Is that something, just to be clear, is that something
13 you feel that would have been comparatively quite
14 simple to do?

15 A. Absolutely. It's do-able. I mean I spent, did
16 I mention already, I spent 10 years prior to the
17 Bamford Review working on Quality Improvement
18 Initiatives in Northern Ireland across the Trusts.
19 We set up Quality Improvement Teams in most settings.
20 It was in mental health, not learning disability,
21 unfortunately, looking back.

13:13

13:13

22
23 Nurses dominated that group and they were very, very
24 competent. And they were very enthusiastic about
25 improving the services and improving safety for their
26 patients. They were onboard with very little effort.
27 We were actually working from the ground up rather than
28 the top down. And that really gave me insight into
29 change management and change processes. I was very

13:14

1 involved at that time with total quality management,
2 we published on it and it was really working.

3 144 Q. So a similar model could have been applied or similar
4 principles could have been applied here?

5 A. I think the Recovery Colleges is almost what has grown 13:14
6 out of that in mental health.

7 145 Q. Professor, I have one final question really which is,
8 I suppose, to bring your evidence to a close just in
9 terms of the questions that I have.

10
11 With the benefit of all of your experience, extensive 13:14
12 experience, and with the learning of the last 20-years,
13 both within Bamford itself and then in your work
14 subsequently on the capacity legislation, can you tell
15 us what you think would need to be done differently to 13:15
16 deliver the Bamford Review ambitions for people with
17 learning disabilities?

18 A. Yes. Well I think addressing the gaps would be the
19 first two things. The gaps in funding. The gaps in
20 workforce strategy and all the other problems that the 13:15
21 Review Team are clearly identifying downwind from the
22 Department. I think this is important, not just for
23 understanding the past, it is about preventing in the
24 future.

25 MR. McEVOY BL: Professor, those are the questions that 13:15
26 I have. It may be that the Panel will have some
27 questions.

28 CHAIRMAN: No, I think, if I may say so, a very good
29 point just to end on. Also to re-assure everyone

1 listening that it is important that we understand the
2 Bamford Review. It is important we understand the
3 outcomes of the Bamford Review, without anybody
4 thinking that we are losing sight of our core Terms of
5 Reference. Everybody knows very well what they are. 13:16

6
7
8 So, can I thank you very much, indeed, for coming to
9 assist us and spending a bit of extra time this
10 morning. It has been enlightening and thank you very 13:16
11 much, indeed, for your help.

12 A. Thank you for inviting me.

13 CHAIRMAN: You can now go with the secretary.
14 We next sit on Monday, I think, that will be at
15 10 o'clock in the morning. 13:16

16
17 THE INQUIRY WAS THEN ADJOURNED TO MONDAY, 3RD APRIL
18 2023 AT 10:00 A.M.